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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies how the interconnectedness embedded in a firm’s economic
environment shapes a variety of corporate policies, including (1) strategic investment, (2)
discovery of sources of risk and its dissemination to shareholders, and (3) valuation of
labor inputs utilized in production. I frame the firm’s economy as a multipartite graph,
wherein corporate directors, executive officers, companies, and product spaces represent
different classes of nodes. Section 1 discusses competitive interaction of company nodes
induced by shared connections to product space nodes. I examine conditionally random
shocks to a firm’s financial flexibility and measure the strategic investment responses by
rival firms sharing a common product space via a causal indirect treatment effect estimator
novel to the finance literature. Section 2 then looks to information flow across companies
through shared connections to director nodes. I study the permeation of conditionally
random cybersecurity events across a director’s current board appointments to investigate
the role of director human capital in monitoring, identifying, and disclosing sources of
firm risk. Section 3 focuses within a company instead of looking across companies, and
is coauthored with Shane Johnson, Adam Kolasinski, and Steve Boivie. We investigate
the interaction of executive officer nodes within a firm by analyzing the effect of a chief
executive officer’s narcissism on his or her valuation of employee human capital.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation will study how the interconnectedness embedded in a firm’s economic
environment shapes a variety of corporate polices, including: (1) strategic investment,
(2) discovery of sources of risk and its dissemination to shareholders, and (3) valuation
of labor inputs utilized in production. In the language of network theory, the economic
environment in which a firm does business is said to be multipartite. This means that there
are multiple independent sets of vertices in the graph characterizing the connections in
the economy. For example, in figure 1.1, we can visualize the product market competition
between firm’s A and B by showing that they both operate in industry P. This is represented
in the graph by showing that both nodes A and B (both in the set of firm vertices) share
edges with node P (in the set of industry vertices). Similarly, if director D sits on the board
at both firm A and firm B, both nodes A and B will share edges with node D (in the set of
director vertices).
Figure 1.1: An Example Multipartite Network
This figure presents an example multipartite network with director, firm, and industry nodes. A product
market rivalry between firms A and B is shown via a shared connection to product space (industry) P.
Similarly, two firms that share a director would have a common director node; an example of this is director
D, who works at both firm and firm B.
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Figure 1.2: Intersection of Boardex and Compustat Databases
This figure presents the entire network of connections that exist within the intersection of the Boardex and
Compustat databases. Directors in the database are mapped to the one or more firms at which they are
appointed, and each of these firms in turn is assigned to a particular industry space based on the firm’s
NAICS code.
The interconnectedness of firms within an economy is vast. Figure 1.2 shows the
shared director and industry connections for firms within the intersection of the Boardex
and Compustat databases over calendar year 2012. Here, industries are measured at the
3-digit NAICS level. The data include over 26,000 directors and 3,700 firms. It is clear
from the graph that there are a substantial number of director and industry connections for
companies in the United States. Economic theory suggests that these inter-firm links lead
to behavior different from simplified settings in which firms operate in isolation without,
for example, product market rivals and shared human capital. The first two sections of
this dissertation will analyze how the network portrayed in figure 1.2 can be used to better
understand how certain corporate policies (investment, risk disclosure) are determined.
The third section will utilize connections within firms characterized by social interactions
of a firm’s managerial team.
2
2. STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO RIVAL FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY
2.1 Introduction
Out of a number of factors that can affect a firm’s capital structure, survey evidence
tells us CFOs are more likely to be concerned about financial flexibility than they are
anything else.1 This means that flexibility, the ability of a firm to access or restructure
its financing, is of first-order importance to managers. However, academics have only
recently begun studying how that flexibility matters.2 Existing work considers the effect
of financial flexibility for an isolated firm; in this paper I investigate the implications of
financial flexibility in the richer economic context in which firms face competition.
I propose two alternate channels through which changes to financial flexibility might
affect peer firms. First, I consider a “Risk Hypothesis” in which shocks to financial flexi-
bility at one firm reveal information about the risk of inflexibility to managers at competing
firms; observing such a shock might lead managers of rival firms to become more cautious
about their future flexibility. Second, I posit a “Predation Hypothesis” that recognizes
inflexibility could mark a point of weakness for a firm that would permit rivals to strate-
gically prey on the firm. My results show that the latter effect dominates: firms raise debt
issuance, investment, and sales growth when peers experience periods of inflexibility. This
competitive cost of inflexibility constitutes a previously undocumented benefit of financial
flexibility.
I use a double randomization identification strategy novel to the finance literature to
study how lost financial flexibility following covenant violations affects rivals who do not
violate covenants. Prior research argues such violations are conditionally random events.3
1Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs and find that, from a list of 14 potential determinants of
debt policy, more CFOs classify financial flexibility as important than they do any other factor.
2See Denis (2011) for a survey of the literature.
3See, for example, Billett, Esmer, and Yu (2016), Chava and Roberts (2008), Demerjian and Owens
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The double-randomization framework is necessitated by the fact that the causal estima-
tors familiar to the finance literature (regression discontinuity, difference-in-differences)
require the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). This assumption rules out
the possibility of indirect treatment effects to non-violators by assuming zero spillover
effects.
The hypothesis that a change in flexibility at firm A might induce a causal effect on
firm B’s outcomes is a direct violation of the SUTVA that requires the treatment effect
at firm A to not change the expected outcome for firm B. This is a fundamental assump-
tion in Rubin’s (1974) potential outcome framework; the power of the SUTVA is that we
can use firm B to predict what firm A might look like in a counterfactual world. This
thought experiment is invalidated though if firm B is indirectly treated via spillover ef-
fects from firm A. The SUTVA lies at the heart of many matching methods (propensity
score matching, differences in differences, regression discontinuity), which makes these
methods unsuitable when spillovers are possible.4 Additionally, I show that if one were
to try to directly extend these SUTVA based estimators to test for spillovers (effects at
non-violating firms due to rival firm covenant violation), the results are opposite in sign to
what a well-identified double randomization estimator would produce.
Following recent developments in the statistics literature, I invoke an observational ap-
proximation to a double-randomized experiment to circumvent SUTVA and uncover how
treatment affects rival outcomes. These methods are developed in Hong and Raudenbush
(2006) and extended in Ferracci, Jolivet, and Berg (2014). To build intuition, consider the
goal of evaluating a new vaccination. It is well understood that if part of a community
receives a flu shot, the rest of the community benefits via the externality of inoculation
(2014), Ersahin, Irani, and Le (2015), Ferreira, Ferreira, and Mariano (2015), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012),
Roberts and Sufi (2009), and Zhang (2016) for a partial sampling of papers using this economic context.
4I show in the next section that using a SUTVA based estimator when spillovers exist produces an esti-
mated average treatment effect (ATE) that is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. In many cases, asking
whether the total (direct plus indirect) effect matters is an economically important question.
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(fewer people are communicating the disease).5 Thus, to test a vaccine, one would want
to randomly treat different communities at different intensities. Looking at the infection
rates of un-vaccinated individuals across communities with, say, 25%, 50%, and 75% in-
oculation levels allows researchers to uncover variation in infection rates for un-vaccinated
persons. This gets towards the causal indirect effect of vaccination on the un-vaccinated
population.
Intuitively, the non-experimental counterpart to double-randomization is to perform
double-matching. First, within an industry-group (where I argue spillover effects might
occur), I estimate matched expected outcomes between firms in order to define average
outcomes as a function of treatment status (covenant violation). Estimation is done group-
by-group, so that predicted outcomes are found conditional on being in a group with a par-
ticular level of treatment intensity (proportion of firms in the group violating covenants).
Second, I take the average outcome of a treated (untreated) firm in a group and match it
across groups to wash out observable differences between industries in order to define the
average outcome of a treated (untreated) firm as a function of the group’s treatment inten-
sity. This generates a causal estimate of indirect treatment effects by showing how average
outcomes of untreated firms vary in response to the proportion of peers in the industry that
violate covenants.
The selection of the spillover group is chosen in a way to minimize the potential for
effects traversing outside of the defined group. Moreover, I additionally show that po-
tential sources of misclassification would lead to outcomes opposite to what I find. As
with any matching estimator, I assume that unobservables do not drive difference between
covenant violators and non-violators; I follow a well established literature on the effects
of covenant violation to control for a large amount of firm-level information. This ensures
that covenant violators and non-violators are, at least on a broad dimension of observable
5http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/826481
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characteristics, similar in financial health.
From the finance literature, I draw two hypotheses for how financial inflexibility via
covenant violation might impact rival firms, leading to indirect treatment effects for non-
violators. First, in what I term the “Risk Hypothesis,” I argue firms could learn about the
risk of entry into covenant violation by observing its ex post effects at firms in violation.
This is consistent with the idea in Leary and Roberts (2014) that managers at competing
firms learn from each other about optimal capital structure decisions and fits the argument
of Roberts and Sufi (2009) that “knowing ex ante that debt contracts impose significant
restrictions on corporate behavior and violation of those restrictions impose significant
consequences, managers may decide to rely less than they otherwise would on debt fi-
nancing.” Additionally, seeing competitors hamstrung by covenant violation makes the
risk of violation especially salient to rival managers. Other economic contexts have shown
salient risks to skew firm policy making away from optimal decisions (Dessaint and Ma-
tray 2015). This channel would suggest that corporate policies at firms whose peers violate
covenants should be more conservative than the policies of firms whose rivals do not vio-
late covenants.
Second, in what I term the “Predation Hypothesis,” I argue managers might exploit
peer firm covenant violations as an opportunity to steal market share from the violators.
This is similar in spirit to theories in which firms without the need to finance externally
prey on levered peers through aggressive pricing (Poitevin 1989; Bolton and Scharfstein
1990). It is worth emphasizing, however, that my identification strategy compares violators
and non-violators who are ex ante characteristically similar – thus, my results are not
driven by firms that are endogenously rich with cash in the pre-treatment period. This
hypothesis asserts that corporate policies at firms whose peers violate covenants should be
more aggressive than the policies of firms whose rivals do not violate covenants.
My results show that expected changes to net debt issuance, investment, and sales by
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both treated and untreated firms are functions of treatment intensity. This indicates a re-
jection of SUTVA and provides causal evidence of strategic reaction to peer-firm changes
in financial flexibility that are consistent with the Predation Hypothesis and in contradic-
tion to the Risk Hypothesis. Due to the double-matching estimation, the non-violating
firms I identify as strategically responding to peer-firm covenant violation are character-
istically similar to the violators. This means that although they were equally likely to
violate a covenant themselves, these non-violating firms choose to respond aggressively to
peer-firm inflexibility.
The analysis presented here contributes to the literature on financial flexibility. Several
recent papers recognize the importance of flexibility in financing (Denis 2011; Denis and
McKeon 2012; Gamba and Triantis 2012; Rapp, Schmid, and Urban 2014), with DeAn-
gelo and DeAngelo (2007) arguing “financial flexibility is the critical missing link for an
empirically viable [capital structure] theory.” The literature on financial flexibility does
not consider the decisions of competitor firms.6 My paper demonstrates a competitive cost
to financial inflexibility that is a novel addition to this literature.
My paper also adds to the literature that analyzes the ramifications of debt covenant
violation. Chava and Roberts (2008) propose three within firm-lender pair drivers of lost
investment stemming from covenant violation (dead-weight losses, creditor intervention,
and tightened credit constraints). My paper identifies a fourth, competitive cost to covenant
violation. The spillovers in debt issuance, investment, and sales growth that I find give
richer economic context to the earlier work of Chava and Roberts (2008), Nini, Smith, and
Sufi (2012), and Roberts and Sufi (2009) by showing what competitors do when their rivals
announce a new covenant violation. None of these papers disentangle direct effects from
potential indirect effects. Consistent with the causal opportunistic responses that I find, a
6An exception is Hege and Hennessy (2010), who consider leverage incentives for an incumbent with
potential entrants. Choice of both debt level and financial covenants are effected by the incentive to deter
entry, since these variables affect the exit outcomes of the entrant.
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recent working paper by Billett, Esmer, and Yu (2016) reports that advertising expenses at
non-violators tend to be higher when their competitors violate covenants.
Finally, I contribute to very recent efforts in the finance literature to understand how
one might estimate effects to indirectly treated units. The strategy here is to utilize a
double-matching approach analogous to double-randomization trials commonly exploited
in other academic fields. Depending on the economic environment and the nature of
how treatment arises, other strategies may be appropriate. For example, both Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang (2015) and Cerqueti, Fiordelisi, and Rau (2015) modify difference-
in-difference designs to fit their needs. Many quasi-natural experiments exist within the
finance and accounting literature (Atanasov and Black 2016). It is unlikely that many, if
any, corporate decisions are made in isolation, so it is useful to have tools that can break
down observed causal responses into direct and indirect changes in outcomes because ob-
servation of these two separate effects gives richer insight into the specific economic forces
that drive differences in outcomes.
Section 2 introduces the novel identification methods employed in this study and sec-
tion 3 describes the data used. Section 4 documents and discusses the empirical findings
of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Methods
This section introduces the identification strategy used for detecting spillovers in treat-
ment effects. The method, developed by Hong and Raudenbush (2006) and extended by
Ferracci, Jolivet, and Berg (2014), is essentially a matching estimator within a matching
estimator via a two-step procedure.7 First, on an industry-by-industry basis, it compares
outcomes between treated and untreated firms based on their likelihood of treatment.8 The
7I sometimes refer to this estimator as a hierarchical matching estimator because matching occurs at both
the individual and the group level, although this terminology is not standard in the literature.
8For notational convenience, I sometimes refer to firms that do not violate covenants as untreated. This
assumes the null hypothesis of no spillover effects.
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first step produces two expected outcomes – an expected response for treated firms, and
an expected response for untreated firms – for each industry-quarter pair in the data.
Second, aggregating to the industry-quarter level, I model predicted outcomes (again,
conditional on treatment) as functions of the intensity of treatment for an industry-quarter.
The intensity of treatment is simply the rate of treatment within the group. Because more
covenant violations might be expected in some industry-quarter pairs, the second step
compares predicted outcomes by matching over a generalized propensity score that allows
for the intensity of treatment to fall anywhere within the unit interval.
2.2.1 Peer Effects in Potential Outcome Models
Given a binary treatment, τi = 1 if firm i receives the treatment and zero otherwise,
and N firms in the population, the 1 × N vector τ describes the treatment state of the
population. The fundamental problem of causal inference is to identify the differences
between outcomes under state τ and outcomes under a different state of treatment, τ ′.
Potential outcomes for firm i are modeled as a function of the treatment, so that yi(τ )
describes what the outcomes for firm i would look like under τ . Letting τ−i denote a
1× (N − 1) vector of treatment assignments with τi removed, potential outcomes can be
represented by yi(τi, τ−i). Note that this setup is general in that it allows the outcome of i
to be a function of the firm’s peers via their treatment: τ−i.
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption presumes a special case of above in
which yi(τi, τ−i) = yi(τi).9 Even with SUTVA in place, causal inference is made difficult
by the fact that if one can observe yi(τi = 1) then the outcome yi(τi = 0) is unobserved
for firm i. Each firm has one observed outcome and thus one unobserved outcome. Dif-
ferences in differences, regression discontinuity, and propensity score / nearest neighbor
matching each invoke SUTVA. In these models, the one unobserved outcome of a treated
9To emphasize the cost of this assumption, Manski (2013) re-labels this the “individualistic treatment
response” assumption.
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firm is approximated by the observed outcome of an untreated firm. In the covenant viola-
tion literature, what this means is that a SUTVA estimator will infer what the counterfac-
tual (no covenant violation) outcome for a covenant violator is by using the information of
non-violators. The implicit assumption is that these non-violators are not changing their
behavior based on the fact that their rival is violating a covenant.
The invocation of SUTVA in a study where spillovers may occur need not invalidate
the estimates found in that study. However, one should be aware that in some circum-
stances the average treatment effect (ATE) will present an inaccurate view of the world.10
As I show by way of example, the sum of the direct effect of the treatment and the indi-
rect (spillover) effect is the average treatment effect reported by a SUTVA estimator (this
is formally presented in Hudgens and Halloran (2008)). This total effect describes the
relative difference in outcomes between treated and untreated firms. In many instances,
whether or not a variable x generates causal effects on differences in outcomes between
treated and untreated firms is itself an economically important question. However, the ex-
ternal validity of such an estimate would be limited by the fact that in other contexts the
spillover channels might be different, and without explicitly addressing these spillovers it
would be difficult to argue how they might change. Additionally, knowledge of indirect
and direct effects permits testing of richer economic theories.
Without SUTVA, the function yi maps a 1×N vector τ into R. Because each element
τj of τ takes one of two values, there are now 2N − 1 unobserved potential outcomes
for each firm. This is a problem that Gitelman (2005) refers to as “the ‘fundamental
problem of causal inference’ in the extreme.” How can one avoid having to estimate
2N − 1 potential outcomes? The key insight of Hong and Raudenbush (2006) is to reduce
the dimensionality of the problem by modeling peer-influences via a scalar function so
10In situations where the direct and indirect effects are of the same sign, but the latter is larger in magni-
tude, one could “infer that a treatment is beneficial when in fact it is universally harmful” (Sobel 2006).
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that
yi(τi, τ−i) = yi(τi, v(τ )). (2.1)
Suppose, for instance, that the function v(·) maps into one of two outcomes: {H,L}.
The four potential outcomes are then y(1, H), y(0, H), y(1, L), and y(0, L). The next
subsection develops intuition for what form one would expect v(·) to take.
2.2.2 Accounting for Peer Effects
This subsection introduces the functional specification for v(τ ). It is important to note
that, along with a slightly more detailed econometric approach, spillover effects are more
complicated to estimate than direct effects because they require more input by the econo-
metrician as to how and in what direction spillovers should permeate across observations.
Different contexts will support different specifications for v(τ ). To emphasize the point:
Remark. Several estimators for spillovers exist, with each identification strategy mak-
ing different economic assumptions about the nature of how spillovers transmit from one
individual to the next.
For example, Cerulli (2015) specifies a function v(τ ) that assumes one-way externali-
ties: the treatment affects outcomes for non-treated units but the non-treated units do not
influence outcomes for the treated units. This makes sense in the context of, say, infor-
mation transfers, but is less likely to be an appropriate assumption when both treated and
untreated firms are expected to make decisions that consider their peers’ choices.
2.2.2.1 A Cournot Example
To develop intuition for the identification strategy detailed below, consider a sim-
ple Cournot oligopoly with N firms. In the base case, these firms are homogeneous in
11
marginal cost so that the linear inverse demand function is given by
p = a− bQ = a− b
N∑
i=1
qi (2.2)
and the profit function for firm i is given by
pii =
[
a− b(qi +Q−i)
]
qi − ciqi (2.3)
with Q−i :=
∑
j 6=i qi. In the case of homogeneous cost, ci = c ∀i it is clear the optimal
output for any firm is q∗i = q
∗ ∀i.
Suppose an alternative world in which some proportion ρ of firms exogenously are
gifted a technology that puts their marginal cost below the cost of their (1 − ρ)N peers.
Thus (1 − ρ)N firms produce at cost cH and the remaining ρN firms produce at cost cL.
At Nash equilibrium, high-cost and low-cost firms produce, respectively:
q∗H =
a− cH + ρN(cL − cH)
b(N + 1)
q∗L =
a− cL + (1− ρ)N(cH − cL)
b(N + 1)
(2.4)
The treatment effect of the technology compares the change in outcomes between an
economy defined by (2.2),(2.3), and (2.4) and an economy defined by (2.2), (2.3), and
(q∗i = [a − cH ]/[bN + b] ∀i). While economically simple, this one-shot model can build
good intuition for how peer effects change firm decisions at equilibrium. In fact, because
the cost parameter is the only parameter characterizing a particular firm, one can think of
these firms as identical outside of the randomly assigned, treated variable. For matching-
based estimators, empiricists are trained to look for un-treated firms that appear otherwise
similar to the treated firm of interest.
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What happens to outcomes when a random subset of firms have lower costs? Figure
2.1 plots equilibrium firm production (q∗) under three different scenarios. Perhaps not
surprisingly, firms with a lower marginal cost than in the counterfactual case of ci = cH ∀i
produce relatively more output. Important to note is that firms with marginal cost structure
cH under both the realized and the counterfactual world do not have the same outcomes in
both scenarios because the outcomes depend on their peers. Peer-firm dependence reveals
itself in the system (2.4) wherein q∗H is a function of cL and q
∗
L is a function of cH .
Graphically, one can see both the direct treatment effect and the indirect treatment
effect as the two vertical distances labeled on the figure (open circles on the figure de-
note counterfactual values and closed circles denote production determined by (2.4)). The
points above the counterfactual values represent firms that experience reduced marginal
costs, and the points below the counterfactual values represent firms who have the same
marginal costs as in the counterfactual case. SUTVA-estimators would report the treat-
ment effect as the sum of the direct and indirect effects. It is perfectly correct to take
the total vertical distance between outcomes for treated and untreated firms to report that
a lower marginal cost positively affects equilibrium production for treated firms. Impor-
tantly, however, such an estimate is incapable of telling whether any of the effect is driven
by changing outcomes for peers.
2.2.2.2 Treatment Intensity
Observe that variation in the number of treated firms in Figure 2.1 affects both the
direct treatment effect and the indirect treatment effect. This suggests that the scalar func-
tion v(·) introduced in (2.1) should capture variation in the proportion of treatment within
the economy. Indeed, the mapping utilized in Hong and Raudenbush (2006) is v(τ ) = 1
if the proportion of treatment is high and v(τ ) = 0 if the proportion of treatment is low.
This produces four possible outcomes: yi(1, 1), yi(1, 0), yi(0, 1), and yi(0, 0); which is
13
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substantially fewer than 2N in all but the most trivial case.
Ferracci, Jolivet, and Berg (2014) extend the methodology in Hong and Raudenbush
(2006) by instead mapping v(·) into [0, 1] rather than {0, 1}. They propose taking the
proportion of treated individuals, so that v(τ ) = τ¯ . In both of these definitions, the implicit
assumption is that treatment of any individual j contributes equally to the peer effect via
v(τ ). When applied to firms, this is less likely to be true. Rather, a weighted average seems
more appropriate so that treatment of a large competitor is allowed a different indirect
effect from treatment of a very small competitor. Thus in my context I assume
v(τ ) =
∑N
i=1 ωiτi∑N
i=1 ωi
(2.5)
with ωi equal to the pre-treatment level of firm assets.
2.2.3 Identification of Treatment Effects
The unit of observation in this study is firm i in industry j at quarter t. Let Ci = c
denote the fact that firm i competes with the set of firms in c. Rather than impose the
non-interference assumption on potential outcomes so that yi(τ t) = yi(τi,t), I impose the
much weaker assumption of group-level non-interference and assume that peer effects, if
they exist, are isolated within an industry. Thus potential outcomes follow
yi(τ t) = yi(τi,t, v(τ t)) = yi(τi,t, ρj,t) (2.6)
with
ρj,t =
∑
{k|Ck=Ci} ωk,tτk,t∑
{k|Ck=Ci} ωk,t
(2.7)
so that the weighted average level of treatment within an industry j at time t is allowed to
affect outcomes for firms in that industry. In my context, what this means is that I allow
15
firms to change their behavior based not only on whether or not they violate a covenant
but also on the proportion of covenant violation within the industry.
There are two dimensions of unobserved outcomes in this model. First, we do not
observe yi(1 − τi,t, ρj,t). This means that we do not observe what the outcomes for a
covenant violator would have been had it not violated a covenant, nor do we observe what
the outcomes for a non-violator would have been had it violated a covenant. Second,
we do not observe yi(τi,t, ρ′) for ρ′ 6= ρj,t. This means that we do not observe what the
outcomes for a firm would have been if a different proportion of firms in the industry had
violated covenants. Estimation of these two counterfactual outcomes are achieved in two
steps. The identification strategy, discussed below, follows that of Ferracci, Jolivet, and
Berg (2014).
2.2.3.1 Potential Outcomes Within a Peer Group
Conditional on operating in a given industry j at time t, take ρj,t to be fixed to some
value ρ. Across this set of firms, the only comparison left to make is to measure differences
in outcomes E[yi(τi,t = 1, ρ)|Ci = c] and E[yi(τi,t = 0, ρ)|Ci = c].
I assume that there are confounders xi such that treatment assignments are condition-
ally random:
yi(τ, ρ) ⊥ τi | xi, Ci = c, ∀τ, ρ, c, i. (2.8)
The selection of covariates, xi, to achieve condition (2.8) are described in the next section.
This assumption requires that within an industry, for any rate of covenant violation ρ, the
assignment of firms to covenant violation status is independent of firm outcomes condi-
tional on x. Along with conditional independence, I require a common support condition,
which states that there is no value of x for which the probability of receiving treatment is
either 0 or 1. Unlike condition (2.8) which is untestable, common support is easily imposed
by simply estimating potential outcomes over the set of observations for which predicted
16
probabilities of treatment are sufficiently within (0, 1). The combination of these two as-
sumptions allows one, for a given group c, to compare treated and untreated outcomes via
traditional matching estimators. This is achieved via an augmented inverse-probability-
weighted estimator. The final product of step one are the estimated outcomes:
Eˆ[yi(τ, ρ)|Ci = c, ρ = ρj,t] (2.9)
for τ ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, for an industry group, c, with a particular value for ρ, expected outcomes for
treated and untreated firms are obtained. The set of firms ultimately used in comput-
ing expected outcomes are similar along all observable characteristics (covariate balance).
Verifying balance group-by-group, and then computation of an aggregate statistic to test
for balance, is left to the appendix. Step two below models how expected responses change
over ρ.
2.2.3.2 Potential Outcomes Across Groups
As mentioned earlier, outcomes are not observed for ρ′ 6= ρj,t. To estimate these
effects, I assume a set of confounders, w at the industry level such that treatment intensity
is conditionally independent of expected outcomes in a given industry:
E[yi(τ, ρ)|Ci = c] ⊥ ρj | wj, ∀c, τ, ρ. (2.10)
The vector wj is chosen as the group-level mean of xi following Hong and Raudenbush
(2006). This vector includes both firm-level predictors of covenant violation as well as
industry-level measures, such as the competitiveness of the group. The assumption in
(2.10) is that the rate of covenant violation in an industry is independent of outcomes for
the average firm conditional on a rich et of controls.
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Since ρ is a continuous variable over the unit interval, the common support assumption
imposed on this step follows Flores et al. (2012). As in step 1, common support is met by
restricting estimation over the set of observations for which the condition is most likely to
hold. Then, using a generalization of the propensity score (Hirano and Imbens 2004) for
continuous treatment levels, one can match expected outcomes in (2.9) over levels of ρ.
This yields the final output11
Eˆ[yi(τ, ρ)|Ci = c]. (2.11)
If either Eˆ[yi(0, ρ)|Ci = c] or Eˆ[yi(1, ρ)|Ci = c] vary over ρ, indirect treatment effects
exist. Variation in the latter expected outcome indicates that peer firm responses change
based on the level of industry treatment, while variation in the former shows that treated
firms change their reaction to treatment based on how many of their rivals find themselves
in the same situation. Variation in either case suggests the traditionally utilized individual-
level non-interference condition, yi(τ ) = yi(τi), is too restrictive.
2.2.4 Two Sources of Endogeneity
There are two separate but equally important endogeneity concerns that necessitate an
empirical model that extends beyond ordinary least squares. First, treated firms may be
characteristically different from untreated firms. This is a well-understood problem in the
empirical finance literature, and I show in section 2.3.2 that treated firms are indeed dif-
ferent than their untreated peers across a number of dimensions. The concern is that the
difference in observed outcomes between the two groups may be different not because of
the treatment variable, but rather because there are other distinctions between treated and
untreated firms that generate variation in responses. Theoretically, these characteristic dif-
11Standard errors for the estimated function Eˆ(yi|τi, ρ) are calculated via a hierarchical bootstrap proce-
dure. This re-samples clusters – industry-quarters – of data with replacement. Within each drawn cluster, a
random subsample of the firms are kept. This is the most efficient way of bootstrapping multilevel data (Ren
et al. 2010). The nature of the bootstrap procedure accounts for the possibility of cross-correlated shocks
between τi and τj for i, j ∈ c.
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ferences are washed out by the matching performed in section 2.2.3.1. Appendix B shows
how to compute a test for covariate balance in which the null hypothesis is that the model
sufficiently balances observable characteristics in each of the intra-group regressions, with
the alternative hypothesis that at least one variable in at least one of the groups is not
balanced between the treated and untreated firms.
The second endogeneity concern in a study of peer effects is that the treatment at the
group level – treatment intensity, ρ – is not randomly assigned. Consider two levels of
ρ: {H,L}, with H > L. A higher level of treatment intensity H could be indicative
of worse industry performance. In this case, differences in outcomes for untreated firms,
E(y|0, H)− E(y|0, L) might be driven by observable, characteristic differences between
one industry group and another. The matching performed in section 2.2.3.2 controls for
differences in the likelihood of a certain treatment intensity to ensure that differences in
outcomes over ρ are due do causal effects of treatment, rather than other differences in
industry groups.
2.2.5 Selection of a Peer Group
An important trade-off exists between the estimation of (2.9) and (2.11). When peer
groups are narrowly defined (for example, a 4-digit NAICS industry classification), the
firms defined in a set of competitors, c, are those that most likely compete directly amongst
each other. If peer effects exist, it is natural to want to look within this narrow set. Restric-
tion of c to narrow groups, however, ignores the fact that firms can change the scope of
their product space. For example, Apple transitioned from a computer company (NAICS
3341) to one that also sold smartphones (NAICS 3342) by moving across 4-digit NAICS
groupings. A broader classification of competitive groups reduces the likelihood of omit-
ted competitors. This is important because the existence of spillovers outside of the group
c violate the assumption of group-level non-interference.
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An additional issue with narrow classifications for c is that, as the set of peer firms
shrinks, so too does the number of observations for which we can estimate (2.9). This can
lead to sample size issues, especially when incorporating a rich set of confounders x into
the model. On the other hand, broad definitions for peer groups will reduce the number of
group-quarter observations in the data necessary to estimate (2.11). Thus, after selecting an
economic basis for assigning peer groups, it is important to utilize a classification scheme
that both satisfies the group-level non-interference assumption as well as leaves ample data
to estimate both intra-group and inter-group effects.
When the data allow (i.e. where there are sufficient group-quarter observations), the
broadest classification of competitive groups seems the most conservative choice. Doing
so minimizes the likelihood that spillover effects carry outside of the specified group c. A
broad group definition will possibly include a number of firms that are not in competition
with the treated units. This biases estimated indirect effects towards zero, making it harder
to reject the null hypothesis of no indirect treatment effect. In this paper, I classify groups
based on 2-digit NAICS codes to keep c as broad as possible.12
Recent work by Zhang (2016) suggests covenant violation by a firm changes its rela-
tionship with its suppliers. Thus, a final consideration in the classification of peer groups
is to acknowledge that customers and suppliers may also be affected by a firm’s covenant
violation. Because a truly complete network of inter-firm relationships would likely have
few if any sub-sets of self-contained groupings of firms, a rigorously defined network of
all possible upstream and downstream trade is empirically prohibitive. There would be
far too few groups with which one could perform inter-group matching to tease out the
12One may wonder whether a revealed, product-based categorization of industry grouping as in Hoberg
and Phillips (2015) would be an appropriate alternative to NAICS (e.g., FIC codes). The difficulty for FIC
codes stems from data loss; firms without a valid product description or without a detailed enough descrip-
tion in their 10-Ks cannot be incorporated in this measure (Hoberg and Phillips 2010). This complicates
measurement of ρ and other group-level variables because some potential competitors might not be assigned
an FIC code. To the best of my knowledge, the statistical properties of double-randomization under various
forms of missing data remains an unanswered, albeit potentially interesting, question.
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effects of ρ. Instead, I use the fact that, according to the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis’ Input/Output Make table, 93% of trade between firms stays within a 2-digit NAICS
grouping. This implies that the bulk of customer/supplier effects are contained within the
groupings chosen for analysis.
Does the potential for customer/supplier effects matter to the results? Certainly, and re-
searchers employing double-matching methods must think carefully about how outcomes
might change because of it. In my context, a firm that encounters a higher expected cost of
restructuring its debt due to covenant violation invests relatively less than peers that do not
(Chava and Roberts 2008). One would expect customers and suppliers to be hit in the same
direction. For example, if a mining company slows its rate of growth, a downstream steel
manufacturer would likewise slow its growth. Therefore a group that includes customers
and suppliers would have expected outcomes between treated and untreated firms that are
less far apart, given that some untreated firms (the upstream and downstream firms) would
look more like a directly treated company, at least with respect to certain outcomes like
investment. My results show that expected outcomes for treated and untreated firms di-
verge as treatment intensity rises, which implies that these effects are more conservatively
estimated than would have been the case if customer/supplier interactions did not exist.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Covenant Violations
Data on covenant violations are observed at a quarterly level, and were compiled for
the analysis in Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) by the authors of that paper.13 The sample
analyzes all 10-K and 10-Q filings between 1996 and 2009 for U.S. firms outside of the
financial industry and matches them to Compustat records.
Per Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), covenant violation waivers frequently expire and
13Thanks to Amir Sufi for making the data available on his website.
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must be extended. Thus one can observe high serial correlation in violation for a given
firm. To isolate the effects driven by truly new changes to a firm’s covenant status, I follow
the literature and focus on new violations. These are covenant violations reported by firms
that have not reported any such violation over the last four quarters. This allows me to
ensure that shocks identified are first instances in which debtors gain increased control
rights.
The emphasis on new violations creates a class of “never-takers” in my sample. Those
firms that violated a covenant in period t cannot be classified as treated in periods t+ 1 to
t + 4. Thus, when predicting investment outcomes at the firm level, I am careful to only
match newly treated firms to those who were eligible for treatment but did not happen to
violate a covenant.14
2.3.2 Firm Fundamentals
All other data come from quarterly Compustat records, with each of the variables used
are in the appendix. The outcomes of interest in this paper are net debt issuance, invest-
ment, and sales growth. Net debt issuance is defined, as in Roberts and Sufi (2009), as
a change in total balance sheet debt. This change is normalized by lagged assets. In-
vestment is given by capital expenditures scaled by prior period PP&E, as in Chava and
Roberts (2008). These two variables are measured as changes in the outcome from the
quarter following the covenant violation relative to the prior quarter. Sales growth is the
sales in the period after the violation less the sales in the quarter of the violation, divided
by sales from the quarter of violation.
I use capital expenditures as a measure of investment for consistency with the earlier
literature. This allows me to break out indirect and direct treatment effects to help better
describe some of the previous results known to occur following debt covenant violation.
14For similar reasons, I exclude zero-leverage firms when predicting outcomes.
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Moreover, the elasticity of capital expenditure restrictions with respect to covenant viola-
tion is higher than that of other loan terms such as interest rates or collateral usage (Nini,
Smith, and Sufi 2009), suggesting capital expenditures are a key concern for creditors.15
Following the literature on covenant violation, I build a rich set of control variables to
predict the likelihood of covenant violation. All variables are measured one period prior
to the quarter of treatment. These follow the same predictors of covenant violation used in
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). This includes variables on which covenant terms are often
written: operating cash flow to average assets, leverage ratio, interest expense to average
assets, net worth scaled by total assets, and the current ratio (Roberts and Sufi 2009).
I also control for cash and cash equivalents, normalized by total assets, since internal
financing is the natural substitute to external financing and can deter predation (Chi and
Su 2016). Return on assets likewise captures a firm’s ability to raise cash via utilization
of its productive assets. I also control for the size of the firm (log of total assets), the
proportion of fixed assets (PP&E/total assets) at the firm, and the growth opportunities
of the firm (market to book). Market controls w are industry averages of all x variables.
Table 2.1 summarizes these variables.
A difference-in-means test between treated and untreated firms shows that these con-
trols can be expected to have explanatory power in determining treatment level. Table 2.2
shows that treated firms have, on average, less cash as a percentage of assets, more debt,
and lower growth prospects (as measured by market to book).
2.4 Do Covenant Violations Affect Non-Violating Firms?
Based on the identification outlined in section 2.2, spillovers in treatment should create
variation in the expected outcomes over group-level treatment intensity. This section tests
15An additional reason to favor capital expenditure policy changes is that many firms report no R&D, and
recent evidence suggests omitted R&D is not truly zero R&D but may be strategically omitted. (Koh and
Reeb 2015).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table summarizes the variables used in this study. Net debt issuance is the change in balance sheet
debt scaled by lagged total assets (Roberts and Sufi 2009). Investment is capital expenditures scaled by
lagged PP&E (Chava and Roberts 2008). Sales growth is the change in sales scaled by lagged sales. Debt
issuance, investment, and sales changes are measured over the quarter following covenant violation. Control
variables are observed in the quarter before an announced covenant violation, and follow the definitions of
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). See Appendix A for details.
Mean Median Std. Deviation
Net debt issuance (bps) 55.427 0.000 487.858
Investment (%) 10.797 4.748 358.437
Sales growth (%) 3.926 2.327 20.521
Operating income / average assets (%) 0.368 2.282 8.750
Leverage ratio 0.262 0.191 0.326
Interest expense / average assets (%) 0.608 0.276 1.217
Net worth / assets 0.416 0.500 0.559
Current ratio 2.814 1.929 2.924
Market / book 2.451 1.504 3.040
Cash / asset 0.190 0.088 0.225
ROA (%) -2.966 0.602 13.143
log(assets) 5.150 5.124 2.236
PP&E / assets 0.262 0.185 0.231
HHI 0.060 0.044 0.053
Observations 147835
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whether covenant violation shocks to creditor control rights at competitor firms affects
outcomes of peers by examining expected outcomes as a function of the proportion of
treated firms in the industry group. Unlike the firm-level measure for treatment, which has
been used in a number of prior studies, group-level treatment via hierarchical matching is
new to this literature. Before utilizing treatment intensity to derive the main results, I first
review a few characteristics of the group-level measure.
2.4.1 Analyzing Treatment Intensity
This subsection discusses some of the properties of the group-level treatment measure,
ρ. In particular, I detail which subsection of the unit interval has sufficient data for peer
effects estimation, the nature of shocks that drive higher treatment intensity, and whether
the measure avoids picking up characteristic differences between industry groups.
2.4.1.1 The Range of the Measure
Variation in the measure of treatment intensity given by (2.7) achieves identification
in treatment effect spillovers via the identifying assumption in (2.10). Prior papers, for
example Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), show that covenant violations are not altogether
rare events. Figure 2.2 shows the time series of covenant violations at both a quarterly and
annual (existence of a new violation at any point in the year) level.
Roughly 6% of firms will report a new covenant violation in any given year (recall that
a new violation is defined to be the first indicated violation of a debt covenant over the last
four quarters). New covenant violations are noticeably more likely to appear in the fourth
quarter of the fiscal year. Sharp spikes in the quarterly data reflect this property. This
feature motivates the inclusion of fiscal quarter fixed effects in both x and w (intra-group
and inter-group confounders).16
16Because w is measured at the industry level, I use quarter of year fixed effects in the inter-market
matching stage (step 2) to approximately capture fiscal quarter effects at a group level. This is because
observations are traced in calendar time, and thus different firms may be at different points in their fiscal year.
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Figure 2.2: Time Series of Covenant Violations
This figure shows the time series of covenant violations at an annual and quarterly level. At the annual
frequency, a firm is marked as violating a covenant if it experiences a new covenant violation (first report of
covenant violation following at least four quarters of non-violation) at any point in its fiscal year.
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On average, about 1.8% of firms report a new covenant violation in any given quarter.
This means that in nearly 2% of firm-quarter observations, firms give up some degree of
control to creditors after violating a covenant. The extant literature on debt and competi-
tion has focused on the case in which rivals to push a firm into bankruptcy by undercutting
the firm and making it unable to repay its debt obligations (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990).
In the data, however, distressed exit occurs at a rate of 0.55%. This means creditor con-
trol via covenant violation is over three times as likely as the more extreme scenario of
distressed exit that usually motivates competitive costs stemming from debt.
A large proportion of industry-quarter pairs experience zero new covenant violation.
These groups do not contribute useful information because there is no intra-group variation
in treatment. On the other side, while a rare few industry-quarters experience a relatively
high degree of treatment intensity, these group-level observations fall far enough into the
right tail of the distribution that matching them by generalized propensity score becomes
problematic (they are omitted by imposition of the overlap assumption). Thus, the range of
group treatment intensity, ρ, over which I can estimate spillover effects is 0% < ρ < 3.5%.
2.4.1.2 Do Shocks Signal More of the Same?
Although conditional independence of treatment (covenant violation) is assumed in
(2.8), this does not mean that the quasi-random “shock” must be purely idiosyncratic.
More than one firm in an industry group might violate a similar debt covenant due to
a common industry shock that affects all firms. If these shocks have some persistence,
higher intensity of treatment in period t should predict an increased likelihood of treatment
in period t+1.17 One reason to think that untreated rivals might mirror their treated peers is
that industry-wide events would induce more conservative financing and investment policy
across the industry (as in the Risk Hypothesis).
17See Hennessy and Strebulaev (2015) for a detailed model of how time-varying treatment probabilities
can influence expected outcomes.
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Table 2.3: Predicting Covenant Violation
This table reports the logistic estimates predicting covenant violation (at treatment eligible firms) as a func-
tion of treatment intensity and firm covariates. Unless otherwise noted, all predictors are measured one
period before observing covenant violation. Regressions also include fiscal quarter fixed effects and indus-
try averages of all independent variables. Marginal effects of each variable are reported in place of beta
coefficients. The second and fourth columns are similar to the first and third columns, respectively, save for
the addition of squared predictors to control for potential non-linear effects.
Treatment intensity 0.034** 0.038** 0.034** 0.038**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Treatment intensity (second lag) -0.007 -0.007
(0.020) (0.018)
Operating income / average assets -0.065* -0.106 -0.065* -0.106
(0.034) (0.104) (0.034) (0.104)
Leverage ratio 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Interest expense / average assets 0.016 0.237** 0.016 0.237**
(0.061) (0.104) (0.061) (0.104)
Net worth / assets 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Current ratio -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Market / book -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash / assets 0.053* 0.033 0.053* 0.033
(0.029) (0.096) (0.029) (0.096)
ROA 0.008** 0.002 0.008** 0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
log(assets) -0.002*** 0.011*** -0.002*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Change in log(at) 0.004 0.008*** 0.004 0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
PP&E / assets -0.006* 0.002 -0.006* 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Change in PP&E / assets 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Squared controls? No Yes No Yes
Marginal effects reported
Standard errors (clustered on industry) in parentheses
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2.3 reports the predicted likelihood of a treatment eligible firm (a firm that has
not reported a covenant violation in the last four quarters) as a function of prior period
treatment intensity, as well as a number of controls. The first column predicts treatment
as a function of x and w, while the second includes squared terms of all variables. The
marginal effect ρj,t−1 is positive and significant (p < 0.05). Changing the treatment in-
tensity from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile raises the likelihood of covenant
violation by 2.6%. This indicates that at least part of the shock that drives firms to vio-
late debt covenants is driven by persistent industry-wide events.18 To determine whether
higher order lags contribute additional information, the last two columns repeat the anal-
ysis in the first two, this time adding a second lag in treatment intensity. The effect of the
second lagged term is small and indistinguishable from zero.
Because lagged treatment intensity positively predicts the likelihood of covenant vio-
lation by firms currently not in violation, I conclude the channel through which the Risk
Hypothesis is expected to operate has merit. The optimal response by these firms might
be to take on more conservative financing and investment policy. This would decrease the
risk of mirroring the fate of their treated peers.
2.4.2 Net Debt Issuance
Do peer effects impact the causal response to treatment? I use the methodology de-
tailed in section 2 to show how debt financing varies over industry treatment intensity. This
extends the estimated negative relative treatment effect in Roberts and Sufi (2009) to vary
over ρj,t. Figure 2.3 shows the estimated direct and indirect treatment effects. The coun-
terfactual world of no covenant violation is the case ρ = 0. For comparison purposes I take
the outcomes at the minimal observed treatment intensity, ρ = ρmin, to approximate zero
18For this reason, I include lagged industry-level covenant violation in the vector of group-level covariates,
w, when predicting firm outcomes. The results are similar when employing a conditional fixed-effects
logistic model to control for industry fixed effects.
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spillover effects (because effects at ρ = 0 are unmeasurable due to overlap conditions);
outcomes for ρ > ρmin include a spillover component. Note that outcomes at ρ = ρmin (or
indeed even ρ = 0) are not mean zero because they are evaluated at x = x¯; the x vector is
suppressed from the expectation expression for notational convenience.
The difference in outcomes between treated and untreated firms imply negative total
treatment effects; treated firms reduce net debt issuance substantially whereas untreated
firms raise net debt issuance. The increase in net debt issuance by untreated firms grows
as the more firms in the industry violate debt covenants, which indicates positive indirect
treatment effects. With few firms treated, net debt issuance at untreated firms is roughly
−45 basis points, whereas an industry with nearly 3.5% of firms treated yields an expected
change of roughly −22 basis points. This response contradicts the Risk Hypothesis that
non-violators will become more conservative upon seeing rivals violate covenants. The
positive spillover effect is suggestive evidence of the Predation Hypothesis, although the
investment and sales growth analysis presented later provides a stronger argument for this
hypothesis.
The main interest in this paper is the slope of the expected outcome, not the level.19
The former gets more specifically to the treatment effect from spillovers since it shows
the expected change in outcomes for an untreated firm as a function of the intensity of
treatment within the peer group. For maximum flexibility the second step of the matching
estimator is done nonparametrically with a kernel function (Flores et al. 2012), however
a crude linear approximation to the observed outcome suggests net debt issuances by un-
treated firms rises by 6.8 basis points for every 1% increase in treatment intensity. This
makes a strong case for spillovers across treated to untreated firms (and evidence that
SUTVA-based estimators ignore the full richness of treatment effects).
19That is, I am interested in ∂E(y|τi = 0, ρ)/∂ρ because the mean is itself irrelevant. For similar reasons,
SUTVA-based estimators do not emphasize E(y|τi = 1) but rather are concerned with the relative outcome:
E(y|τi = 1)− E(y|τi = 0). This is similar to ∂E(y)/∂τ for discrete τ .
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Change in Net Debt Issuance Following Covenant Violation
This figure shows the estimated causal change in net debt issuance as a function of industry treatment inten-
sity (proportion of new covenant violation in the industry). Both violators, τ = 1, and non-violators, τ = 0,
are allowed to have outcomes that are effected by peer treatment, ρ. Predicted changes in net debt issuance
are determined according to the double-matching algorithm presented in section 2.2. Confidence intervals
at the 10% level are shown as dashed lines, where standard errors are computed via a hierarchical boot-
strap. Change in debt issuance is measured as the first difference of the change in balance sheet debt, scaled
by lagged assets. Test statistics for group-by-group covariate balance are reported below the figure (see
appendix for details). The counterfactual world with no covenant violation is approximated by y(0, ρmin),
spillovers are identified by observing ∂y(0, ρ)/∂ρ 6= 0. The results show that non-violators increase net
debt issuance as peer treatment increases.
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• Koziol & Perlman: ∑mj=1 Jj = 38.6 (p-value = 1)
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In contrast to untreated firms, the expected change in net debt issuance by treated firms
decreases as more of their peers find themselves in similar circumstances. When few firms
are treated, covenant violators reduce their debt issuance by an average of about 145 basis
points. In contrast, when many firms are in a state of covenant violation, treated firms
reduce net debt issuance by almost 400 basis points. This makes sense given that more
severe shocks are likely to hit a greater number of firms.
To what extent do spillover effects matter? Moving the level of group treatment inten-
sity from 1% to 3% increases the expected level of net debt issuance by untreated firms
by 10.9 basis points. This is a 19.6% increase from the mean net debt issuance of 55.427
basis points. Over the same interval, net debt issuance by treated firms falls by 40.4 basis
points. Thus, the relative difference in expected outcomes between treated and untreated
firms grows by 51.3 basis points, with 21% of that gap driven by indirect treatment effects
(spillovers) at untreated firms.
A natural question is whether all firms are equally likely to tap external financing. In
particular, the likelihood of a firm approaching creditors for financing should be related
to how much cash the firm can raise via operations. Therefore, I partition the expected
level of net debt issuance by whether the firm is above or below its industry mean level of
operating income (scaled by average assets).20 Figure 2.4 presents the estimated spillover
effects for non-violators conditional on whether the firm has a high amount of operating
income.
The results show a clear difference in borrowing between firms that have a high vs.
low amount of operating income. The predicted change in net debt issuance for untreated
firms with lower income demonstrates a clear indirect treatment effect of rival covenant
20Step one of the matching estimator calculates Eˆ[yi,j(τi, ρ)|Ci = c, ρ = ρj , xi,j ], although for con-
venience the vector x is usually omitted in the text. Partitioning expected outcomes by dichotomizing the
kth element of x yields E{Eˆ[yi,j(τi, ρ)|Ci = c, ρ = ρj , xi,j ]|xki,j > x¯kj } = Eˆ[yi,j(τi, ρ)|Ci = c, ρ =
ρj , xi,j , x
k
i,j > x¯
k
j ] by the law of iterated expectations. I then estimate the last term in the previous equation
as a function of ρ via generalized propensity score matching.
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Figure 2.4: Heterogeneities in Effects on Debt Issuance (Non-Violators)
This figure extends the result in figure 2.3 to allow for heterogeneous effects of non-violators, τ = 0.
I partition predicted levels of net debt issuance by observations with above and below average operating
income in the prior period. The results show that the increase in net debt issuance by non-violators is driven
primarily by firms who do not bring in as much cash through operations.
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violation. As the proportion of competitors violating covenants rises from 1% to 3%,
spillover effects at untreated, low-income firms rise by 200%.
In contrast the untreated, high-income firms show almost no sensitivity in debt issuance
to peer-firm treatment. This makes sense, given that these firms raise more cash via op-
erations. A similar effect is found for treated firms in figure 2.5: low income covenant
violators lose a greater degree of access to debt markets than do higher income firms.
In sum, the borrowing patterns of untreated firms suggests that “untreated” is indeed
a misnomer. These non-violating firms, although characteristically similar to the firms
in my sample that violate debt covenants, seek additional debt financing in the period
following peer firm treatment. This effect is stronger for firms that are more likely to need
external financing to fund aggressive investment policies (as predicted by the Predation
Hypothesis).
2.4.3 Strategic Investment
Do competitors increase investment when their peers violate debt covenants? It is clear
from figure 2.3 that treated firms lose a substantial degree of financial flexibility following
covenant violation. I now turn to whether competitors react to this expected loss in cash
flow from financing. Figure 2.6 shows the corresponding change in investment to treated
and untreated firms. When few firms violate covenants, the treated (violation) firms reduce
investment by an average of roughly 50 basis points. At higher treatment intensity, when
the expected decline in net debt issuance is even greater, this reduction balloons to about
550 basis points.
At low levels of treatment intensity, untreated firms exhibit an average increase in cap-
ital expenditures by roughly 40 basis points. At the highest levels of observed treatment
intensity, this average outcome doubles in magnitude. Untreated competitors raise invest-
ment by 80 basis points when more of their peers lose at least part of their access to debt
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Figure 2.5: Heterogeneities in Effects on Debt Issuance (Violators)
This figure extends the result in figure 2.3 to allow for heterogeneous effects of violators, τ = 1. I partition
predicted levels of net debt issuance by observations with above and below average operating income in
the prior period. The results show that the decrease in net debt issuance by violators is driven primarily by
firms who do not bring in as much cash through operations since banks may view their repayment risk to be
higher.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated Change in Investment Following Covenant Violations
This figure shows the causal responses – changes in expected outcomes – of treated and untreated firms
based on the degree of group treatment intensity. Confidence intervals at the 10% level are shown as dashed
lines, where standard errors are computed via a hierarchical bootstrap. Change in investment is measured
as the first difference of capital expenditures, scaled by lagged PP&E. Test statistics for group-by-group
covariate balance are reported below the figure (see appendix for details).
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First stage covariate balance (null hypothesis is covariate balance):
• Fisher’s Method: −2 ∗∑mj=1 log(pj) = 0.0013 (p-value = 1)
• Koziol & Perlman: ∑mj=1 Jj = 39.3 (p-value = 1)
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financing. The upward-sloping indirect treatment effect is consistent with opportunistic
investment motives. Untreated competitors know their peers will lose financial flexibility
following a covenant violation (and even more so when treatment intensity is high).
At the mean level of treatment intensity, I find roughly an 80 basis point gap in invest-
ment between treated and untreated firms (consistent with the point estimates of Chava
and Roberts (2008), whose calculation of an average treatment effect (ATE) includes both
a direct and an indirect effect). However, I show that part of this gap is driven by untreated
firms increasing their investment above the counterfactual level (the level of investment in
a situation where no competitor violates a covenant). For larger shocks that push a larger
proportion of firms into violating covenants, the relative gap in investment between treated
and untreated firms grows substantially, in part because of more aggressive investment on
the part of untreated firms.
As with net debt issuance, spillovers constitute a nontrivial amount to the relative dif-
ference between treated and untreated firms. Moving the level of group treatment intensity
from 1% to 3% raises the expected level of investment by untreated firms by 23.2 basis
points. This is a 2.1% increase over the mean level of investment in the data. In contrast,
over the same interval, expected investment by firms that violate covenants falls by 487.3
basis points. Thus, approximately 4.5% of the increase in the difference in expected in-
vestment between treated and untreated firms follows from spillover effects to firms that
do not violate covenants.
The change in industry investment patterns following a shock to financial flexibility
highlights a previously overlooked cost of inflexibility. Whereas previous papers have
emphasized the role creditors can play, outside of default, in shaping corporate invest-
ment decision-making, none recognize the spillover effect that this has to competitor
firms. Moreover, unlike in the theoretical incumbent-entrant model of Hege and Hen-
nessy (2010), wherein an incumbent hoping to deter entry will reduce financial flexibility
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and consequently lower its innovative output (via debt overhang) and competitor innova-
tion (via entry deterrence), the exogenous shock to realized inflexibility here is shown to
increase investment at competitor firms.
2.4.4 Sales
Do firms benefit when rivals violate covenants? The observed increase in investments
and net debt issuance by untreated firms suggests their intent is to capture market share
from their rivals. I test whether this strategy is successful by considering the expected level
of sales growth following violation. Figure 2.7 plots sales growth for treated and untreated
firms as a function of industry treatment intensity.
Here, we see that outcomes for untreated firms improve, and outcome for treated ri-
vals deteriorate, as group treatment intensity rises. Consistent with the more aggressive
financing and investment decisions shown by untreated firms, these firms exhibit stronger
sales growth when more of their peers violate covenants. Again, the spillover constitutes
a significant portion of the difference in outcomes between treated and untreated firms.
Moving the level of group treatment intensity from 1% to 3% raises sales growth at un-
treated firms by 1.4 percentage points. This constitutes a 35.7% increase over the sample
mean of 3.926% quarterly growth. Over the same interval, sales growth drops 13.3 per-
centage points at firms that violate covenants. Spillovers therefore make up 9.5% of the
increasing gap in expected sales growth between treated and untreated firms.
2.4.5 A More Naive Approach
One natural question that arises from the discussion of SUTVA and use of a hierarchi-
cal matching estimator is what cost the econometrician pays for use of an estimator not
explicitly meant to incorporate spillover effects. In the context of covenant violation, nu-
merous authors have recognized the endogenous nature of violation: some firms are more
prone to violate covenants than others, given their fundamentals. This motivates match-
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Change in Sales Following New Covenant Violations
This figure shows the causal responses – changes in expected outcomes – of treated and untreated firms based
on the degree of group treatment intensity. Confidence intervals at the 10% level are shown as dashed lines,
where standard errors are computed via a hierarchical bootstrap. Sales growth is the percentage increase in
sales. Test statistics for group-by-group covariate balance are reported below the figure (see appendix for
details).
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ing estimators that contrast outcomes between violators and non-violators by including
confounders that predict covenant violation. As discussed earlier, however, the proportion
of firms in the industry is also not entirely random. One should expect worse industry
performance to correlate with greater rates of covenant violation. Suppose that one were
to attempt to estimate the effect of spillovers by simply including ρ, industry treatment
intensity, as a control variable in a linear regression framework that one typically finds in
the empirical study on covenant violation. That is, add ρ to a regression that would include
an indicator for treatment status, firm-level covariates x, and industry-level covariates w.
This functional specification follows that of Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi
(2009), and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012).21
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results. Based on the results from the hierarchical
matching estimator, the effect of ρ should be positive in sign for net debt issuance, invest-
ment, and sales growth. In stark contrast to this claim, the point estimate of ρ is negative in
all specifications and statistically distinguishable from zero in some. This means inclusion
of ρ into a regression without addressing the endogeneity that some industries will have
a higher rate of violation due to observable industry characteristics can lead a researcher
to make the wrong conclusion. For example, table 2.4 shows that a naive regression will
report that non-violators decrease investment when a higher proportion of firms in the in-
dustry violate covenants. This could follow from the fact that a greater rate of covenant
violation in the industry is associated with poor industry prospects. The collective evi-
dence of this table clearly shows that inappropriately specified regression frameworks will
not consistently luck out and draw the econometrician to the correct conclusion.
21This approach is referred to as a “quasi-discontinuity” by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012); while not
strictly a regression discontinuity, Roberts and Sufi (2009) report that this method and a strict regression
discontinuity used on a subsample of firms with at least one of two accounting covenants yield similar
estimates on the effect of covenant violation.
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2.5 Conclusion
To what extent does financial flexibility (the ability to raise and restructure financing)
matter to a firm? Past work has emphasized the direct effects of flexibility: firms endoge-
nously defer external financing to future periods in which they anticipate the arrival of
costly investment projects. This paper extends flexibility to competitive effects. Strategic
reactions by rivals could mitigate the costs of inflexibility if sources of shocks to flexibility
are partially correlated across firms, and thus competitors become more conservative when
rivals lose flexibility (Risk Hypothesis). Alternatively, strategic reactions by rivals could
exacerbate the costs of inflexibility if these competitors view inflexibility as an opportunity
to gain market share (Predation Hypothesis). I show that a change to the flexibility of peer
firm financing causally raises competitor net debt issuance, investment, and sales growth.
Collectively, these results imply that financial inflexibility makes a firm appear weaker to
rivals, consistent with the Predation Hypothesis.
An important aspect of this paper is the use of a spillover effects estimation procedure
that can uncover externalities in treatment. SUTVA-based estimators (regression discon-
tinuity, difference-in-differences, propensity score matching) are completely sufficient to
establish relative effects. However, a substantially richer understanding of equilibrium
firm incentives can come from determining whether externalities to untreated peers are
negative or positive. In the present context, strategic responses account for 5 to 20 percent
of the variation in the difference in outcomes between firms that do violate covenants and
those that do not. Few techniques for measuring spillovers have been implemented thus
far, although the nature of competition between firms suggests exogenous shocks to peer
firms would warrant response by rivals.
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3. DIRECTOR EXPERIENCE AND CYBERSECURITY EVENTS
3.1 Introduction
Close to half of the directors we surveyed said “we know [cyber security] is an
issue, but we don’t even know what kinds of questions we should be asking.”
– Jean-Marc Levy, interview for NYSE Governance Services’ Boardroom View
A number of large-scale, high-profile security breaches (Target Corp., Home Depot,
Community Health Systems, Yahoo, etc.) has pushed cybersecurity risk to the forefront
of public attention. The need for cybersecurity is quite clear; an analysis of S&P 500
firms found that nearly 90% of the aggregate value of these firms came from intellectual
property and other intangibles (Stathis 2015). The repercussions of a cybersecurity breach
can be quite large: Verizon lowered its bid price for Yahoo by $350 million after Yahoo
announced that its users’ information had been stolen (Knutson 2017). On average, a
firm’s stock price drops 0.37% on news of a data breach. A rules-based, “check-the-boxes”
style of cybersecurity management appears to be at best a partial solution to the problem.
Target Corp., for example, was certified compliant with the Payment Card Industry’s (PCI)
security standards just weeks before it fell victim to a massive malware attack that stole
customer payment information (Bjorhus 2014). The rising need for stronger cybersecurity
monitoring has led the issue to become the number one topic in corporate board rooms
(FTI 2014). Today, 89% of directors regularly discuss cybersecurity at board meetings
(NACD 2017).
Due to the importance of the topic, some have asked the SEC to provide increased
guidance regarding how firms should disclose cybersecurity risk in their annual filings
(Langevin and Himes 2015). The SEC, in turn, has called on boards of directors to become
more proactive in managing cybersecurity risk (Aguilar 2014). There is even a legislative
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effort to require boards to disclose the presence of a “cybersecurity expert,” much like
how SOX required the disclosure of a “financial expert” (Reed, Collins, and Warner 2017).
Many directors openly admit an inadequate understanding of cyber risk. One survey found
that 39% of directors felt they would perform better at cyber risk oversight if they had a
better understanding of how to do so (Scally 2014).
Despite the rising discussion of cybersecurity in the popular press, the increasing role
cybersecurity plays in boardroom discussions, and the ongoing policy debate about how
to best structure cybersecurity monitoring and risk disclosure, little academic work exists
on the topic. I study two important questions in this paper. First, how does cybersecu-
rity experience affect a director’s risk monitoring? In particular: are firms overseen by
experienced directors less likely to suffer a data breach, and do firms that are overseen
by experienced directors disclose cybersecurity risk differently than those that are not?
Second, are there reputational penalties for experiencing a data breach?
I use a database of publicly reported cybersecurity events (security breaches) at U.S.
companies over 2005 to 2016.1 These data are provided by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
which aggregates reports of cybersecurity events across the country. To my knowledge,
this paper is the first in the finance literature to use this dataset. The data are comprised
of public announcements of security breaches across the 47 states that have laws requir-
ing the disclosure of breaches that involve personally identifiable information.2 The data
also include notifications triggered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which are federal regulations covering,
respectively, financial institutions and health plans/providers.3
I treat these cybersecurity events as conditionally random shocks to a director’s expe-
1The dataset is available for download at www.privacyrights.com
2New Mexico became the 48th state with breach disclosure regulation in April 2017. The two remaining
states without disclosure rules are Alabama and South Dakota.
3A thorough discussion of state and federal regulations on breach notification laws is available at
www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf.
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rience with cybersecurity. This variation in director exposure to cybersecurity is valuable
in testing the effect of director experience on firm cybersecurity risk. In general, it is dif-
ficult to test whether director expertise causally affects a firm’s cybersecurity outcomes
because of the endogenous matching between directors and firms. Firms at higher risk of
data breaches may be more likely to hire a director with cybersecurity experience. Thus,
to sidestep this matching issue, I look to announced data breaches and study effects on
firms that already employ a director when she is exposed to a cybersecurity event. This
removes the endogenous matching between director expertise and firm risk by generating
a shock to a director’s cybersecurity human capital.
To separate firm-level effects of a data breach from director-level monitoring changes,
I focus my analysis of director risk monitoring on the other firms at which the director
is employed when she experiences a cybersecurity event. I refer to these firms as cyber-
affiliated firms, since they employ directors affiliated with a data breach at another com-
pany. One important point to recognize is that although this identification strategy removes
the endogenous matching between a director with cybersecurity experience and a firm, it
does not remove the possibility some firms are more likely to be cyber-affiliated than oth-
ers. Indeed, several observable characteristics of firms are different between those that are
and are not cyber-affiliated. To address this issue, I propensity score match cyber-affiliated
firms to not-cyber-affiliated firms and show that these observable differences do not exist
in the matched set.
Within the matched set of firms for which breach affiliation is assumed to be a con-
ditionally random event, I find that firms that employ a breach affiliated director are 15%
more likely to disclose cybersecurity risk as a risk factor in the firm’s 10-K filing. The
increased likelihood of cybersecurity risk disclosure rises once a director experiences their
first data breach somewhere else, and does not change following additional cybersecurity
experiences. However, although the incidence of cybersecurity disclosure rises for firms
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that are connected (via a director) to a data breach, the quality does not. I proxy for the
quality of a risk disclosure by considering whether the addition of a cybersecurity disclo-
sure happens via inclusion of a new risk factor to the 10-K filing or via an insertion of
cyber-related text into an existing risk factor in the document. The latter case becomes
more likely when firms employ a breach-affiliated director.
I next show that the propensity of a firm to suffer a data breach is lower when the firm
happens to employ a director that experiences a cybersecurity event at one of their other
firms. The marginal probability of a data breach falls 87% when one of a firm’s directors
experiences a data breach at one of their other appointments. As with the incidence of
disclosure, effects on the realized probability of suffering a cybersecurity event are isolated
to the first instance in which a director experiences a data breach. Subsequent breaches
have zero economic and statistical effect.
Finally, I consider the reputational costs of cybersecurity events by analyzing the likeli-
hood of director turnover following a data breach. Directors who experience more than one
cybersecurity event are substantially (59%) more likely to lose their positions at hacked
firms. First time directors are more likely to hold on to their positions. There are no effects
at a hacked director’s other appointments (where a cybersecurity event did not occur). It is
well known that directors face turnover risk following monitoring failures (Ertimur, Ferri,
and Maber 2012; Fich and Shivdasani 2007; Srinivasan 2005). However, the extent to
which the labor market learns about director quality is still unknown. This paper shows
that reputational penalties for poor cyber monitoring depend, in part, on the director’s his-
tory of cybersecurity events. Whereas first-time hacked directors experience no increased
turnover risk (and simultaneously, demonstrate higher monitoring going forward), direc-
tors that are affiliated with multiple cybersecurity events are punished in the labor market.
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3.2 Data
This section introduces the data used in the paper. Firm-level accounting data come
from Compustat. Director-level information comes from Boardex. The Compustat sample
runs through fiscal year 2015, but the Boardex data ends June 2015. I link Boardex com-
pany identifiers to the CRSP/Compustat universe following Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons
(2012) – this match procedure utilizes Levenshtein matching, ticker symbols, and Interna-
tional Security Identification Numbers (ISIN) to connect identifiers. Data on cybersecurity
events and on risk factor disclosure are unique to my paper and detailed below.
3.2.1 Cybersecurity Events
This paper uses all security breaches reported between 2005 and 2016 and recorded
by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC). This dataset aggregates all reports of cybersecu-
rity breaches published according to a state’s breach disclosure law. These laws require
individuals in that state to be notified if their personal information is lost by a company
entrusted with it. The first state to enact such a law was California in 2002. Following
a wave of state-level laws in the mid-2000s, all states except two (Alabama and South
Dakota) have disclosure laws in place. The dataset also includes breaches reported in
accordance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, which are federal regulations covering, respectively, financial
institutions and health plans/providers.
Although breach notification laws vary by state, many of the fundamental aspects of
the disclosure requirements are similar. Personal information loss that triggers disclosure
includes social security numbers, drivers license numbers, or financial information, al-
though some states also extend this to include biometric information, a passport number,
date of birth, etc.4 The disclosure timeline also varies by state. For example, California law
4https://www.bna.com/complicated-compliance-state-data-breach-notification-laws/
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requires disclosure of a breach be made “in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay” (California Civil Code 1798.29) while in Ohio the disclosure must be
made “in the most expedient time possible but not later than forty-five days following its
discovery” (Ohio Code 1349.19).
The PRC data categorizes reported data losses by the nature of the event that caused
the loss. All cybersecurity events are classified as either: HACK (electronic entry by an
outside party), CARD (electronic payment fraud, e.g. capturing credit card terminal data),
INSD (data loss due to an insider taking advantage of a system), PHYS (lost, stolen, or
discarded paper documents), PORT (lost, stolen, or discarded portable electronic devices),
STAT (lost, stolen, or discarded electronic devices not designed to be moved), DISC (unin-
tended/accidental disclosure), or UNKOWN (all other events). I use all intentional forms
of attack (HACK, CARD, INSD) in my analysis because accidental events – for example,
a PORT event resulting from a misplaced laptop – are less likely to be subject to director
level oversight.
The institution name identified by PRC is matched into firm names from CRSP using
the Levenshtein algorithm to compare string values. Perfect matches are kept, and the
remainder of the data are reviewed by hand and attached to a permco identifier where
appropriate. Most of the observations in PRC do not link to CRSP because they are small
private firms, non-profits (including education), or privately owned health care providers.
One limitation of data breach information is that the severity of the breach is not al-
ways clear. A breach in the PRC data will include an estimated number of records lost
(i.e., number of customer’s who lost personal information) where possible, but this infor-
mation is not always known. In the event PRC learns new information about the number of
records that were lost (e.g. when the company updates their initial report after discovering
a broader breach then originally believed), the data in PRC are revised to reflect the new
numbers.
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3.2.2 Risk Factor Disclosure
Data on firm disclosure of risk factors is text mined from the DirectEdgar database,
which pre-processes 10-K filings and separates out Item 1A into an HTML document that
I parse with Python’s BeautifulSoup html pareser. Item 1A of a firm’s 10-K filing discloses
certain risk factors that a firm faces. I search for terms relating to cybersecurity risk (e.g.
“hackers”). The full list of search terms is provided in the appendix.
I study both the incidence of cyber disclosure and the way in which cybersecurity
disclosures are added to a firm’s 1A filing. In the former case, a simple text search of
whether the firm uses any of the aforementioned cybersecurity risk words is sufficient. In
the latter, I am interested in the quality of this disclosure. This is measured in two ways.
First, I look at whether a firm begins disclosing cyber security risk by adding a entirely new
risk factor to the firm’s 1A filing or by adding cybersecurity risk to an existing disclosure.
Second, I look at cybersecurity disclosures that include cyber-relevant terminology in the
header of the risk factor and compare them to disclosures where cyber terminology is
exclusively used in the body of the risk factor. The former features cybersecurity risk
more prominently whereas the latter is more likely to be a case in which the firm includes
multiple sources of rare event risk (disastrous weather, terrorism, et cetera) in a single
factor. Figure 3.1 presents examples of each case.
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Panel A: Example case of a firm adding a new risk factor that discloses cyber risk 
An interruption or breach in security of our information systems may result in financial losses, loss of customers, or 
damage to our reputation.  
We rely heavily on communications and information systems to conduct our business. In addition, we rely 
on third parties to provide key components of our infrastructure, including loan, deposit and general ledger 
processing, internet connections, and network access. These types of information and related systems are critical to 
the operation of our business and essential to our ability to perform day-to-day operations, and, in some cases, are 
critical to the operations of certain of our customers. The risk of a security breach or disruption, particularly through 
cyber attack or cyber intrusion, including by computer hackers, has increased as the number, intensity and 
sophistication of attempted attacks and intrusions from around the world have increased. As a financial institution, 
we face a heightened risk of a security breach or disruption from threats to gain unauthorized access to our and our 
customers' data and financial information, whether through cyber attack, cyber intrusion over the internet, malware, 
computer viruses, attachments to e-mails, spoofing, phishing, or spyware. 
Our customers have been, and will continue to be, targeted by parties using fraudulent emails and other 
communications to misappropriate passwords, credit card numbers, or other personal information or to introduce 
viruses or other malware through "trojan horse" programs to our customers' computers. These communications 
appear to be legitimate messages sent by the Bank, but direct recipients to fake websites operated by the sender of 
the e-mail or request that the recipient send a password or other confidential information via e-mail or download a 
program. Despite our efforts to mitigate these tactics through product improvements and customer education, such 
attempted frauds remain a serious problem that may cause customer and/or Bank losses, damage to our brand, and 
increase in our costs.  
Although we make significant efforts to maintain the security and integrity of our information systems and 
we have implemented various measures to manage the risk of a security breach or disruption, there can be no 
assurance that our security efforts and measures will be effective or that attempted security breaches or disruptions 
would not be successful or damaging. Even the most well protected information, networks, systems and facilities 
remain potentially vulnerable because attempted security breaches, particularly cyber attacks and intrusions, or 
disruptions will occur in the future, and because the techniques used in such attempts are constantly evolving and 
generally are not recognized until launched against a target, and in some cases are designed not to be detected and, 
in fact, may not be detected. Accordingly, we may be unable to anticipate these techniques or to implement 
adequate security barriers or other preventative measures, and thus it is virtually impossible for us to entirely 
mitigate this risk. A security breach or other significant disruption could: 1) Disrupt the proper functioning of our 
networks and systems and therefore our operations and/or those of certain of our customers; 2) Result in the 
unauthorized access to, and destruction, loss, theft, misappropriation or release of confidential, sensitive or 
otherwise valuable information of ours or our customers, including account numbers and other financial 
information; 3) Result in a violation of applicable privacy and other laws, subjecting the Bank to additional regulatory 
scrutiny and expose the Bank to civil litigation and possible financial liability; 4) Require significant management 
attention and resources to remedy the damages that result; or 5) Harm our reputation or cause a decrease in the 
number of customers that choose to do business with us. The occurrence of any such failures, disruptions or security 
breaches could have a negative impact on our results of operations, financial condition, and cash flows.  
10-K Filing by Bank of Hawaii Corporation for fiscal year end December 31, 2011 
Figure 3.1: Two Example Disclosures of Cybersecurity Risk
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Panel B: Example case of a firm updating an existing risk factor to include cyber risk 
Operations risks may adversely affect our business and financial results. 
The operation of our electric generation, and electric and gas transmission and distribution systems involves 
many risks, including breakdown or failure of expensive and sophisticated equipment, processes and personnel 
performance; operating limitations that may be imposed by equipment conditions, environmental or other 
regulatory requirements; fuel supply or fuel transportation reductions or interruptions; transmission scheduling 
constraints; and catastrophic events such as fires, explosions, severe weather or other similar occurrences. In 
addition, our information technology systems and network infrastructure may be vulnerable to internal or external 
cyber attack, unauthorized access, computer viruses or other attempts to harm our systems or misuse our 
confidential information.  
We have implemented training and preventive maintenance programs and have security systems and 
related protective infrastructure in place, but there is no assurance that these programs will prevent or minimize 
future breakdowns, outages or failures of our generation facilities or related business processes. In those cases, we 
would need to either produce replacement power from our other facilities or purchase power from other suppliers 
at potentially volatile and higher cost in order to meet our sales obligations, or implement emergency back-up 
business system processing procedures.  
10-K Filing by The Empire District Electric Company for fiscal year end December 31, 2011 
Operations risks may adversely affect our business and financial results. 
The operation of our electric generation, and electric and gas transmission and distribution systems involves 
many risks, including breakdown or failure of expensive and sophisticated equipment, processes and personnel 
performance; operating limitations that may be imposed by equipment conditions, environmental or other 
regulatory requirements; fuel supply or fuel transportation reductions or interruptions; transmission scheduling 
constraints; and catastrophic events such as fires, explosions, severe weather or other similar occurrences.  
We have implemented training, preventive maintenance and other programs, but there is no assurance 
that these programs will prevent or minimize future breakdowns, outages or failures of our generation facilities. In 
those cases, we would need to either produce replacement power from our other facilities or purchase power from 
other suppliers at potentially volatile and higher cost in order to meet our sales obligations.  
These and other operating events may reduce our revenues, increase costs, or both, and may materially 
affect our results of operations, financial position and cash flows.  
10-K Filing by The Empire District Electric Company for fiscal year end December 31, 2010 
Figure 3.1 (Continued)
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In panel A, Bank of Hawaii Corporation adds a risk factor discussing cybersecurity
risk to its 10-K filing for the period ending 12/31/2011. Its previous filing, for the period
ending 12/31/2010 did not include this factor. Thus, I classify Bank of Hawaii Corpora-
tion as including a new cybersecurity disclosure. The risk factor disclosure by Bank of
Hawaii Corporation is three paragraphs long, and it discusses both the potential cyberse-
curity threats faced by the firm as well as possible consequences of a security breach. In
panel B, The Empire District Electric Company updates an existing risk factor to include
a discussion of cybersecurity risk. I classify this firm as updating on old disclosure to
include cybersecurity risk. The added disclosure is one sentence long and recognizes that
a cybersecurity threat exists.
To identify the different risk factors in the html document, I analyze the structure of
formatting rules used in the document. The headers to each risk factor are assigned special
formatting as visual cues to the reader. For example, some documents use bold font, some
use italics, some use a different color, etc. I look over the distribution of formatting rules
applied to the entire document and assume that the most common formatting structure are
the body paragraphs to a risk factor and that the second most common formatting rule is
the one identifying risk factor headers. Before reviewing the distribution of formatting
rules, I exclude table and list paragraphs (e.g. those including a <tr> or <li> tag) from
the distribution since some factors can include long bullet lists of subitems. I place all
table text into the preceeding body paragraph so that it is included when searching for
cybersecurity words.
After finding the risk factor headers for a firm in years t and t − 1, I vectorize the
headers using tf-idf and compute the pairwise cosine similarity between each risk factor
header in t and each risk factor header in t − 1. This yields a matrix of cosine scores. To
determine whether a factor in t is novel, or whether it is an updated version of a factor
in t − 1, I create a mapping between the factors in t and t − 1 that maximizes the total
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pairwise cosine similarity between the two years. Table 3.1 provides an example matrix
of cosine similarity scores.
Table 3.1: Example Mapping of Risk Factors Between t− 1 and t
This table provides an example mapping between risk factors for a firm at time t and time t − 1. Each cell
reports the cosine similarity between rf it and rf
j
t−1. In this example, rf
b
t−1 maps to rf
C
t , rf
a
t−1 maps to
rfBt , and rf
A
t is classified as a new risk factor. To establish a mapping between t − 1 and t I convert each
element, ai,j in the matrix (a cosine similarity) by |1−ai,j | and apply the Hungarian Method to the resultant
matrix.
rfAt rf
B
t rf
C
t
rfat−1 0.032 0.95 0.09
rf bt−1 0.12 0.21 0.99
This matrix of cosine similarity scores records how closely each risk factor header at
time t − 1 matches a risk factor header at time t. I determine the best mapping between
the time t − 1 factors and the time t factors by transforming each element of the matrix,
ai,j by |1− ai,j| and applying the Hungarian Method to the resultant matrix. This method
maps each risk factor in t − 1 to a factor in t such that no two factors in t − 1 point to
the same factor at t, and the total cosine similarity of each pair of factors is maximized.
In the reported analysis, an assigned pair is considered to be a successful match (the risk
factor at t is the same as at t − 1) if the cosine similarity between the two is at least 0.95
(similarity is measured on a scale of 0 to 1). Results are robust to alternative cutoffs (e.g.
1, 0.9). I allow for scores less than 1, a perfect match, in order to allow for the possibility
that risk factor headers could re-phrase or modify text from one year to the next. However,
as scores move further below 1, there is an increased likelihood that the assigned (t− 1, t)
pair of risk factors discuss different concepts.
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3.2.3 Summary Statistics
In the analysis that follows, I create two indicator variables that turn on when a director
experiences a data breach at one of her firms. First, to allow for differential effects for the
first time a director is exposed to a data breach, I create an indicator variable “First expe-
rience with cyber” that turns on the first time a director experiences a data breach (it does
not turn back on for any additional breaches). Second, I create an indicator variable “Addi-
tional experience with cyber” that turns on whenever a director experiences a cybersecurity
event after her first breach. A director’s first experience may be different than additional
experiences because more information is revealed to the director at the first event. In my
data, 696 directors are affiliated with a data breach, and 12% of these experience more
than one data breach in their careers. Additionally, because about half of corporate boards
have 3-year staggered election cycles (Fos et al.), the treatment dummy variables “First
experience with cyber” and “Additional experience with cyber” switch on for two years at
a time in all of my analysis. This aligns the treatment duration with the average director’s
post-breach turnover risk concern that I discuss in detail in the next section.
In all specifications, I use a number of controls to capture the potential cybersecurity
risk that a firm faces. I include four firm size and performance measures: ROA, log of total
assets, log of the number of employees, log of sales. These controls capture observable
differences in firms that may lead to a firm being targeted by hackers (e.g. those with more
sales may have more customer information to steal, and those with more employees may
have more employee information to steal). Additionally, I control for observable board
characteristics: independence of the board, average director age, board size, board busy-
ness, whether the firm has a tech committee, and whether the firm has a risk committee.5 I
also control for the firm’s cyber history: whether the firm has had a data breach in the past,
5These committee assignments are not given standard names in the Boardex database and the appendix
lists the committee names I use to classify a committee as assigned “tech” or “risk.”
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whether the firm disclosed cyber risk in its past filings, and (if disclosure was made) the
length of the cyber disclosure. Finally, I control for the number of industry competitors (at
a 2-digit NAICS level) that experience a data breach.6
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for all variables used in the paper. Panel
A reports director-level observables. The variables of interest here are an indicator for
whether the director experiences their first data breach (across all board appointments
past and present) and an indicator for whether the director gains additional experience
with cybersecurity via a data breach. These director-level variables are used in predicting
turnover hazards of directors following cybersecurity events. To control for whether a
director has specific experience with technology oversight, I create a classification for
“tech experts.” This is an indicator variable for whether the director was ever appointed
(across all board positions past or present) to a technology committee. Definitions for what
committees I consider to be technology committees are reported in the appendix.
Panel B reports firm-level observables. The variables of interest here are an indicator
variable for whether any director at the firm experiences their first data breach (at one of
their other board appointments) and an indicator variable for whether any director at the
firm experiences an additional data breach (at one of their other appointments). These are
used in predicting changes in cybersecurity monitoring at the firm level. In my sample,
35% of firms report cybersecurity in their annual disclosure of risk factors.
3.3 Cybersecurity Monitoring
Does cybersecurity experience affect a director’s monitoring of cybersecurity risk? The
assumption implicit in calls for increased cybersecurity expertise on boards is that directors
without such expertise will not be as capable at monitoring this type of risk. One source of
resistance to such a requirement is that the labor pool of qualified, “cybersecurity experts”
6Finer partitions to more detailed industry categorizations are impossible due to the relative sparseness
of data breaches in the data.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the data used. Panel A reports director-level variables, while panel
B reports firm-level variables. All variables are defined in section 2.
Panel A
Mean Std. Dev.
First experience with cyber 0.009 0.094
Experience with cyber 0.012 0.111
Age 61.108 9.039
Age over 65 0.331 0.470
Female 0.111 0.315
Num. directorships 1.610 0.987
Independent dir. 0.940 0.237
Previous cyber exp. 0.009 0.092
On tech committee 0.014 0.117
On risk committee 0.019 0.138
On audit committe 0.581 0.493
Tech expert 0.031 0.173
Risk expert 0.034 0.181
Audit expert 0.753 0.431
Panel B
Mean Std. Dev.
Firm is hacked 0.007 0.084
Discloses cyber risk 0.358 0.479
First experience with cyber 0.052 0.223
Additional experience with cyber 0.037 0.189
Percent independent 0.828 0.087
ROA -0.025 0.217
log(total assets) 6.661 2.057
log(number of employees) 1.220 1.197
log(sales + 1) 5.999 2.205
Avg. director age 60.481 4.792
Number of directors 8.456 2.466
Busy board 0.039 0.194
Firm has tech. committee 0.030 0.170
Firm has risk committee 0.032 0.177
Hack(s) in industry 8.420 8.204
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may be insufficient to supply the needs of public companies. Therefore, as an alternative,
others have attempted to address the issue of IT in the boardroom by proscribing a set
of governance questions directors should ask management regarding IT policy (including
cybersecurity).7 It is not clear then, whether having a director classified as a “cybersecurity
expert” on the board is necessary to effectively monitor cybersecurity risk.
The empirical challenge in identifying an effect of cybersecurity experience on mon-
itoring cybersecurity risk is the endogenous matching between director skills and firm
demands. Firms at greater risk of suffering a cybersecurity event, for example, may be
more likely to hire a cybersecurity expert. To identify an effect of cybersecurity expe-
rience on director monitoring, I use cybersecurity events reported in the PRC dataset to
measure observable changes in a director’s first-hand experience with cybersecurity risk.
Because changes in cybersecurity monitoring at a breached firm cannot be isolated to
director choices, the emphasis of my tests is on changes in cyber monitoring at a breach-
affiliated director’s other firms (if they have any other board appointments). I ensure that
these board positions were in place at the time of the reported data breach to avoid the
possibility that these directors are endogenously hired for their cybersecurity experience.
I then test whether the change in cyber experience resultant from a data breach changes a
director’s monitoring policy at these other firms at which they work as directors.
One remaining identification challenge to studying cybersecurity monitoring at breach-
affiliated firms is that some firms may be more likely to employ a director that is exposed to
greater cybersecurity risk at their other appointments. Panel A of table 3.3 shows that many
observable firm characteristics differ between firms that are and are not breach-affiliated.
For example, breach affiliated firms have larger firms, because having more directors on
the board raises a firm’s chance that at least one director experiences a data breach. Larger
firms are more likely to be breach affiliated, likely because larger firms employ directors
7This was the approach used by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2004.
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who have positions at other large firms, and large firms have a higher probability of being
breached.
I wash out these observable differences between firms by propensity score matching
breach-affiliated firms to those that are not breach-affiliated.8 Descriptive statistics for the
matched subsample are reported in panel B of table 3.3. Across all observable dimensions
included in this study, matched firms appear identical to breach-affiliated firms. Under
the assumption of unconfoundedness, whether or not a firm in this matched sample is
breach-affiliated is a conditionally random event.
After matching, I use two outcomes to indirectly infer the amount of cybersecurity
monitoring at a firm. First, I study the disclosure of cybersecurity risk in Item 1A of
a firm’s 10-k filing. Second, I look to the estimated likelihood of a firm suffering a data
breach. These two measures capture, respectively, the disclosure of risk and the realization
of risk at a firm. Unfortunately, the specific cyber policies of a firm are not publicly
reported, and expenditure on IT is not specifically broken out in a firm’s reporting of
capital expenditures. However, despite these limitations, the two proxies of monitoring I
use are quite powerful. Disclosure of cyber risk is itself a topic of much policy debate, and
the propensity of a data breach event is exactly the outcome of interest in cyber monitoring.
Stronger monitoring should result in greater risk disclosure and a decreased likelihood of
experiencing a data breach, and one would therefore expect that breach affiliated firms
would exhibit a higher propensity to disclose cybersecurity risk and a lower propensity to
be hacked.
3.3.1 Cybersecurity Risk Disclosure
Are directors with cybersecurity experience more likely to recognize cyber as a form
of risk? Although SEC guidance on risk factor disclosure recommends these factors be
8To ensure all firms are eligible to be classified as breach-affiliated, only firms whose directors hold
multiple appointments are considered in the matching estimation.
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Table 3.3: Mean Differences Between Indirectly Treated and Untreated Firms
This table reports summary statistics for two subsamples: firms that employ a breach-affiliated director
(where the breach occurs at some other board appointment for the director) and firms that do not. Panel A
reports statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports statistics for the matched sample where observations
are matched according to the propensity score for being breach-affiliated.
Panel A
Means Medians
Untreated Treated p Untreated Treated p
Percent independent .825 .866 0 .857 .889 0
ROA -.03 .035 0 .02 .054 0
log(total assets) 6.517 8.338 0 6.576 8.482 0
log(sales + 1) 5.83 7.961 0 5.961 8.228 0
log(number of employees) 1.112 2.463 0 .731 2.51 0
Number of board connections 11.884 23.266 0 10 22 0
Avg. director age 60.467 60.642 .206 60.714 61 .114
Number of directors 8.313 10.11 0 8 10 0
Hack(s) in industry 8.486 7.653 0 6 6 .167
Discloses cyber risk .243 .355 0 0 0 0
Firm was previously hacked .025 .098 0 0 0 0
Busy board .031 .132 0 0 0 0
Firm has tech. committee .028 .048 0 0 0 0
Firm has risk committee .032 .036 .442 0 0 .442
Panel B
Means Medians
Untreated Treated p Untreated Treated p
Percent independent .867 .865 .577 .889 .889 .88
ROA .041 .035 .169 .055 .054 .516
log(total assets) 8.303 8.323 .743 8.336 8.467 .278
log(sales + 1) 7.954 7.947 .907 8.079 8.197 .304
log(number of employees) 2.437 2.451 .764 2.382 2.51 .664
Number of board connections 23.241 23.164 .843 23 22 .691
Avg. director age 60.722 60.642 .589 61 61 .595
Number of directors 10.055 10.093 .647 10 10 .229
Hack(s) in industry 7.647 7.676 .908 6 6 .306
Discloses cyber risk .355 .355 .995 0 0 .995
Firm was previously hacked .09 .097 .491 0 0 .491
Busy board .115 .128 .25 0 0 .25
Firm has tech. committee .057 .049 .283 0 0 .282
Firm has risk committee .035 .036 .899 0 0 .899
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as firm-specific as possible, this is often not the case (Concept Release on Business and
Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K). Therefore in this section I will investi-
gate not only the incidence of cybersecurity risk disclosure but also the types of disclosures
that are made.
I study the propensity to disclose cyber risk by modeling this disclosure as a function
of firm-level observables. The effects of interest are the coefficients on “First experience
with cyber” and “Additional experience with cyber” which are dichotomous variables that
capture whether any board member is exposed to a data breach at a different firm. I also
control for whether the firm itself was breached, whether the firm disclosed cyber risk
in the past, as well as firm-level performance variables (e.g. sales) that might affect a
firms likelihood of being targeted by a data breach and governance variables (e.g. board
independence) that capture observable differences in board structures. All regressions
include time and industry fixed effects to absorb constant latent time and industry variation
in cybersecurity disclosure.
I approach risk disclosure in three ways. First, I test whether director exposure to a
data-breach changes a firm’s incidence of cybersecurity risk disclosure in the firm’s 10-k
filing. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the incidence of risk disclosure is determined by
performing a text search on Item 1A of the 10-K filing for words related to cybersecurity
risk.
Table 3.3.1 reports estimated marginal effects of director cyber experience on the prob-
ability of a firm disclosing cyber risk. As a baseline, the typical firm in my matched sub-
sample is 50% likely to report cybersecurity risk. This incidence rises by 7.4 percentage
points (p-value < 0.00) after a director at the firm experiences their first data breach at
one of their other boards. The 7.4 percentage point increase in disclosure likelihood trans-
lates into an 15% increase over the baseline probability of disclosing cybersecurity risk. A
firm’s propensity to disclose cybersecurity risk does not significantly change when any of
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Table 3.4: Probability of Disclosing Cybersecurity Risk
This table estimates the probability of a firm disclosing cybersecurity risk as a function of firm-level observ-
ables. All variables are defined in section 2. The variables of interest are “First experience with cyber” and
“Additional experience with cyber.” The former indicates that at least one of the firm’s directors is connected
to a cybersecurity event at another firm and that this is the director’s first experience with a data breach. The
latter indicates that at least one of the firm’s directors is connected to a cybersecurity event and that this is
not the director’s first experience with a cyber event. Industry and time fixed effects are included but not
reported. Coefficient estimates on additional control variables, listed in Panel B of Table 3.2, are not reported
for brevity. Column one uses a logit specification, column two uses a complementary log-log model, and
column three uses a linear probability model.
First experience with cyber 0.074*** 0.049** 0.041***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.014)
Additional experience with cyber 0.013 -0.012 0.016
(0.028) (0.026) (0.018)
Firm was breached -0.037 0.039 0.021
(0.095) (0.077) (0.072)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pr(Disclose | Experience = 0) .49 .49 .48
N 2246 2246 2256
Industry and time fixed effects not reported.
Marginal effects on the probability of the outcome variable are reported.
Standard errors (clustered on industry) in parentheses
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
its directors experience additional data breaches at other appointments.
The incidence of cybersecurity risk disclosure, however, does not yield insight into
how risk disclosure is made. In particular, as discussed in section 3.2.2, firms can include
mention of cybersecurity risk by one of two means. First, firms can add a new risk factor
to their 10-K filing. Second, firms can update an existing risk factor to include a discussion
of cybersecurity risk.
I construct two proxies to capture the quality of a new cybersecurity risk disclosure.
First, I divide cybersecurity disclosures between those that happen by adding a new risk
factor to a firm’s filing and those that happen by updating an existing risk factor. This
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captures the quality of a disclosure under the assumption that a newly added risk factor
is more specific to cybersecurity whereas a risk factor that is updated to include a men-
tion of cybersecurity is less specific.9 Second, I divide cybersecurity disclosures between
those that include cybersecurity words in the header of a factor and those that only include
cybersecurity terms in the body of the factor. This captures the quality of a cybersecurity
disclosure under the assumption that disclosures that feature cybersecurity more promi-
nently in the header of the risk factor text do a better job of highlighting the risk associated
with cybersecurity events.
Table 3.5 reports the estimated marginal effects of a director’s outside experience with
cybersecurity on a firm’s disclosure of cybersecurity risk. In Panel A, I proxy for the
quality of a new cybersecurity disclosure by dividing new disclosures between those that
happen via a new risk factor and those that happen via an addition to an existing risk fac-
tor. I assume that new risk factors are more specific descriptions of cybersecurity risk and
therefore of higher quality. The marginal change in the probability of switching from no
new cybersecurity disclosure to a new cybersecurity disclosure via a new risk factor is a
13.7 percentage point increase (p-value< 0.00) for firms that employ a breach experienced
director. The marginal change in the probability of switching from no new cybersecurity
disclosure to a new cybersecurity disclosure via an addition to an existing risk factor is
a 18 percentage point increase (p-value < 0.00) for firms that employ a breach experi-
enced director. Thus, a new data breach experience for a director significantly changes the
likelihood that a connected firm discloses cybersecurity risk, consistent with table 3.3.1.
However, the last column of table 3.5 shows that the marginal change in the probability of
disclosing cybersecurity risk via updating an existing risk factor is 4.3 percentage points
9Strictly speaking, an existing risk factor that adds a cybersecurity component is necessarily less than
100% on the topic of cybersecurity. It is possible however that a newly risk factor that includes a cyberse-
curity component is still a “kitchen-sink” disclosure that adds other risks besides cybersecurity risk into a
single disclosure, and therefore no more specific.
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Table 3.5: Probability of Adding Cybersecurity Disclosure
This table estimates the probability of a firm adding a cybersecurity risk disclosure to its 10-K filing by
considering categorical outcomes proxying for the quality of a new disclosure. Marginal effects computed
from a multinomial logistic regression are reported. Controls, time fixed effects, and industry fixed effects
are included but not reported below to conserve space. Control variables are identical to those in table 3.3.1.
Standard errors are clustered on the industry and reported in parentheses below the marginal effects.
Panel A
Case 1: No change in cybersecurity disclosure (baseline)
Case 2: At least one new factor disclosing cyber is added
Case 3: The only new cyber disclosure addition is through updating an existing factor
Pr(2)-Pr(1) Pr(3)-Pr(1) Pr(3)-Pr(2)
First experience with cyber .137∗∗∗ .180∗∗∗ .043∗
(.037) (.041) (.022)
Additional experience with cyber .046 .047 .000
(.059) (.076) (.036)
Panel B
Case 1: No change in cybersecurity disclosure (baseline)
Case 2: Cyber is added to the header of a risk factor (more prominent)
Case 3: Cyber is added only to the body of a risk factor
Pr(2)-Pr(1) Pr(3)-Pr(1) Pr(3)-Pr(2)
First experience with cyber .058∗ .096∗∗ .039
(.033) (.047) (.026)
Additional experience with cyber .019 .061 .042
(.028) (.037) (.027)
higher (p-value = 0.05) than the probability of disclosing cybersecurity risk via release of
a new risk factor. This implies that although the incidence of cybersecurity disclosure is
positively affected by director experience with data breaches, the quality of disclosure, if
anything, falls.
Panel B of table 3.5 uses the prominence of cybersecurity in the risk disclosure as a
proxy for the quality of the disclosure. In particular, I assume that use of cybersecurity
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language in the header of a risk factor constitutes a higher quality disclosure than cases
in which cybersecurity is exclusively discussed in the body of the factor. This is a second
method to parse out differences between risk factors that exclusively discuss cybersecurity
risk versus risk factors that lump in cybersecurity risk with many other rare events (natural
disasters, terrorism, et cetera). The marginal probability of a firm disclosing cybersecurity
risk in the header of a risk factor increases by 5.8 percentage points (p-value = 0.08)
when a firm’s board includes a breach affiliated director. The marginal probability of
disclosing cybersecurity risk exclusively in the body of the risk factor’s text increases by
9.6 percentage points (p-value = 0.04) over the baseline case of no new cybersecurity
disclosure. While the differences in marginal effects here is not significant at conventional
levels (p-value = 0.14), the point estimate is consistent with panel A: breach-affiliated
directors increase the incidence of cybersecurity disclosure, but more often through lower
quality disclosure.
3.3.2 Future Cybersecurity Events
As a second measure of director cybersecurity monitoring, I use the propensity of the
firm to suffer a data breach in the following year. One limitation of cyber risk disclosure
is that it could be cheap talk. The board may encourage the firm to disclose cyber risk
merely in an attempt to limit their liability to shareholders without taking real steps to
ensure cybersecurity events are made less likely. Therefore, in this subsection I study the
realized likelihood of suffering a data breach to learn whether directors with cybersecurity
experience lower their firms propensity to suffer a data breach. Importantly, I look at
shocks to a director’s experience with cybersecurity and its effect on firms at which the
director is already employed. This removes the potential that breach-affiliated directors
will endogenously seek out less risky board appointments in the future.
Table 3.3.2 presents the estimated marginal effects on a firm’s propensity to suffer a
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Table 3.6: Probability of Experiencing a Data Breach
This table estimates the probability of a firm suffering a data breach as a function of firm-level observables.
All variables are defined in section 2. The variables of interest are “First experience with cyber” and “Ad-
ditional experience with cyber.” The former indicates that at least one of the firm’s directors is connected
to a cyber security event at another firm and that this is the director’s first experience with a data breach.
The latter indicates that at least one of the firm’s directors is connected to a cyber security event and that
this is not the director’s first experience with a cyber event. Industry and time fixed effects are included but
not reported. Coefficient estimates on additional control variables, listed in Panel B of Table 3.2, are not
reported for brevity. Column one uses a complementary log-log model specification, column two uses logit,
and column three uses a linear probability model.
First experience with cyber -0.004* -0.005* -0.016**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Additional experience with cyber 0.001 0.000 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Firm was previously hacked 0.004** 0.004** 0.081***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pr(Breach | Experience = 0) .0048 .0053 .0285
N 2651 2651 2651
Industry and time fixed effects not reported.
Marginal effects on the probability of the outcome variable are reported.
Standard errors (clustered on industry) in parentheses
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
data breach. Note that for completeness, I report results for a linear probability model
alongside the logit and complimentary log-log (sparse outcome robust) models. However,
the predicted probabilities of suffering a data breach are negative in over 35% of the obser-
vations under a linear probability model which suggests that the linear model specification
is a poor fit for the data.
The estimated marginal effect of employing a director who experiences their first data
breach at another firm is to lower the firm’s propensity to suffer a data breach by 0.5 per-
centage points (p-value 0.04). This lowers the firm’s probability of having a cybersecurity
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event by an economically significant 87%. In contrast, employing a director who experi-
ences additional data breaches at another firm does not change the firm’s risk of having a
cybersecurity event (p-value 0.98).
The combined results of tables 3.3.1, 3.5, and 3.3.2 imply that directors who are ex-
posed to their first corporate data breach increase their cyber monitoring at their other
current firms. These connected firms (those that also employ these directors) are more
likely to disclose cyber risk and less likely to experience a data breach. Monitoring gains
do not change when directors are exposed to additional cybersecurity events.
3.4 Director Turnover
Given that directors increase cybersecurity monitoring after experiencing a data breach,
and that their monitoring does not increase for each additional breach experienced, how
do labor market outcomes change in response to breach events? Past work documents rep-
utational costs (increased turnover) for directors following intentional misrepresentations
at the firm (Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber 2012; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). Higher turnover
risk also exists for audit committee members following restatements (Srinivasan 2005) be-
cause restatements indicate a monitoring failure by the directors on this committee. In this
section, I investigate turnover outcomes for breach-affiliated directors.
Similar to Srinivasan (2005), I consider the possibility that directors will face differ-
ential reputational penalties for working at a firm that suffers a data breach based on the
specific role of the director. In my context, I search the Boardex database for all committee
names that indicate the director is assigned to a technology role at the board (e.g. “cyber
security,” “information technology and security,” or “I.T. oversight”). The full list of com-
mittee names that I classify as a technology role are provided in the appendix. Directors
assigned to a technology role on the board may have more direct oversight of cyber risk
and therefore stronger reputational penalties following a data breach. The number of firms
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with technology-related committees is quite small. Thus, as an additional check, I also
classify directors as technology experts if they have ever served on a technology-related
committee on any of their past or present board appointments. Directors who are technol-
ogy experts may be perceived to have greater responsibility over cyber policies at a firm
even if that firm does not have its own technology committee.
As an additional check for heterogeneous reputational penalties, I follow survey ev-
idence from the National Association of Corporate Directors regarding the allocation of
cyber responsibilities at the board (NACD 2017). In this survey, only 5% of directors
report that their firm assigns cyber risk oversight to a technology committee. This is con-
sistent with the observed rarity of technology committees in the Boardex data. Per the
survey, 11% of firms assign the cyber risk oversight role to the risk committee, 51% assign
the role to the audit committee, and 41% assign the responsibility to the full board (the
survey allowed directors to select multiple responses). Because I cannot observe which
committee at a particular firm is assigned the bulk of cyber monitoring duties, I create a
dummy variable “cyber responsibility” in the following way. If the board has a technology
committee, I assume the majority of cyber monitoring falls with it. If the board does not
have technology committee but has a risk committee, I assume the majority of cyber moni-
toring falls with it. If the board has neither a technology committee nor a risk committee, I
assume the principal responsibility for monitoring cyber risk falls on the audit committee.
Finally, I consider an interaction effect of cybersecurity experience with whether or
not a firm had previously disclosed cybersecurity risk. The interaction term here is a
test of whether or not directors that previously warned shareholders of the potential for a
cybersecurity event are less likely to lose their job following a data breach.
I model the turnover hazard for a director using the Cox proportional hazard model. I
control for director-level observables: age, an indicator for whether the director is over 65,
the number of directorships the director holds, an indicator for if the director is female, an
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indicator for if the director is classified as independent, indicators for whether the director
is on the technology, risk, or audit committees (where technology and risk are defined as
described above), indicators for whether the director is a technology, risk, or audit expert
(again, as defined above), and whether the director had any experience with a data breach
before being hired at the firm. I also control for firm-level observables: return on assets,
log of total assets, the percent of institutional holdings, the percentage of independent
directors at the firm, board size, and whether the firm previously disclosed cyber risk in its
annual filings.
Table 3.7 presents the estimated hazard ratios. Recall that in a hazard regression, a
ratio of 1 indicates no effect. When a firm reports a data breach, and a director at the
firm has previously experienced one or more cybersecurity events, the director’s hazard of
turnover is 1.59 (p-value < 0.00). This hazard ratio implies that the director is 59% more
likely to leave the firm relative to the baseline case in which no breach is reported. When
a firm reports a data breach and this is the first time that a director at the firm is associated
with a cybersecurity event, that director faces a hazard of turnover of 0.67 (p-value =0.04).
Thus directors who experience their first data breach are 33% less likely to turn over in
the following year. This is consistent with staying on the board to review and clean up the
aftermath of a cybersecurity event. A director’s hazard of turnover at a particular firm does
not change if one of the director’s other firms reports a data breach.
I find no evidence that the reputational cost of experiencing a data breach varies ac-
cording to a director’s committee appointments. I test for these effects in columns 2-4 of
table 3.7. The statistically insignificant effects on various committee memberships, inter-
acted with breach announcements, is consistent with the apparent uncertainty regarding
which of a firm’s directors are assigned a cyber monitoring role (NACD 2017).
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses a novel database of cybersecurity events (public announcements of data
breaches) to study director learning and reputational penalties. Directors who gain first-
hand experience from a data breach at one of their firms put this knowledge to work at their
other appointments. These connected firms are 15% more likely to disclose cybersecurity
risk in their annual filings, and 87% less likely to suffer a data breach. These two results
imply that directors with real cybersecurity experience are more successful at monitoring
cybersecurity risk. Given reports that 89% of directors regularly discuss cybersecurity at
board meetings (NACD 2017), it seems unlikely that these effects are purely driven by a
saliency channel.
Interestingly, although the cybersecurity experienced directors lower a firm’s likeli-
hood of suffering a data breach and increase a firm’s propensity to disclose cybersecurity
risk, these directors do not lead firms to more detailed disclosures of cybersecurity risk.
Rather, experienced directors are more likely to add a cyber risk disclosure to an exist-
ing risk factor (instead of creating a new risk factor dedicated to cybersecurity risk) and
less likely to feature cybersecurity prominently in the header of the risk factor’s text. One
explanation for this could be that experienced directors recognize the limitations of more
detailed disclosure in fully anticipating possible threats to the company and therefore chose
to disclose the risk via a broader, more general statement.
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4. CEO NARCISSISM, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND FIRM VALUE
4.1 Introduction
We examine empirically how CEO narcissism affects firm value through the channel
of human capital, in particular through the increased turnover of employees, both at the
executive level and in the general labor pool. A large literature in finance, management
and accounting (discussed below) examines how CEO psychological characteristics im-
pact firm investment, acquisition policy, and profitability. There is little work, however,
on how such characteristics impact firm value through the channel of managing and re-
taining a firm’s employees and their human capital. Narcissism is a consequential and
clinically well-defined personality trait that has been thoroughly studied in the psychology
literature. It has been found to be highly prevalent among people in powerful positions,
including CEOs (see e.g., Judge, LePine, and Rich (2006)), and it has a strong effect on
how an individual interacts and works with people (see e.g., Nevicka et al. (2011)). CEO
narcissism is thus likely to significantly impact how firms utilize their human capital. La-
bor costs account for over half of U.S. GDP, so human capital is undoubtedly an important
input to firm value.1 Thus, the research question of how CEO narcissism impacts firm
value through the human capital channel is of first order importance, and yet it remains
unexplored.
Both theory and empirical findings in the extant literature on narcissism motivate our
examination of how CEO narcissism impacts firm value through the human capital chan-
nel. One of the defining characteristics of narcissists is a lack of empathy (see e.g., Mac-
coby (2004)). Hence, narcissism in the CEO could increase firm value by making the
CEO less hesitant to terminate executives and workers who are under-performing. Prior
1For 2015, GDP and total labor compensation were, respectively, $17.95 and $9.68 Trillion, according
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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research additionally suggests, however, that narcissists also tend to underestimate the
value of skills in others, possibly leading narcissists to reduce firm value by underestimat-
ing the loss of value in human capital when making termination decisions. In addition,
prior research indicates that others find it unpleasant to work with narcissists, so CEO nar-
cissism could harm firm value by causing the voluntary departures of non-CEO executives
who possess valuable, firm-specific human capital that is costly to replace.2
The observations above motivate the hypothesis that the likelihood of turnover of non-
CEO top management team (TMT) members should increase in the presence of higher
levels of CEO narcissism. Following Aktas et al. (2016), we use a measure of CEO nar-
cissism previously validated in the psychology literature: the ratio of first person singular
pronouns to the sum of first person singular and first person plural pronouns in unscripted
CEO speech (e.g., Foster and Campbell (2007), Raskin and Shaw (1988).) Consistent
with the hypothesis, we find that CEO narcissism increases the odds of departures of other
top management team (TMT) members (+13.6% as narcissism moves from one standard
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean). We further examine how the
CEO’s narcissism is related to the stock price reaction to news of a TMT member’s de-
parture. The effect of narcissism on the announcement return is negative if the departing
TMT member has been with the firm for three years or longer. Since longer-serving TMT
members are more likely to have accumulated valuable firm-specific human capital, this
result implies that the tendency of narcissists to undervalue human capital can reduce firm
value when CEO narcissism induces the turnover of long-serving TMT members.
Secondary results support the hypothesis that TMT member turnovers in a firm with
a narcissistic CEO are driven by narcissism. Regardless of CEO narcissism, non-CEO
executives who are closer to the CEO in pay prominence (adjusted for industry norms)
2See e.g., Bushman and Thomaes (2011), Morf and Rhodewalt (2001), Zeigler-Hill, Myers, and Clark
(2010), and Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994).
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are less likely to depart. But, the positive relation between the likelihood of non-CEO
departure and CEO narcissism is significantly amplified for non-CEOs with greater pay
prominence. Theory and evidence from the psychology literature suggests that a narcis-
sistic CEO would likely perceive other highly-paid executives as drawing or threatening
to draw attention away from the CEO, whose narcissism causes him to crave such atten-
tion. Thus, highly-paid TMT members are either forced out by the narcissistic CEO or
they leave voluntarily because it is unpleasant to work with him. Although the data do
not permit us to reliably distinguish between terminations versus voluntary departures, we
note that either cause can lead to the loss of valuable human capital.3
We also find a positive relation between CEO narcissism and mass layoffs of non-
executive employees. CEO narcissism increases the odds of a mass layoff (+15.3% as
narcissism moves from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the
mean), but how the stock market reacts to the news of narcissist-initiated layoffs depends
on the value of workers’ human capital. Because we cannot obtain data on tenure for non-
executive employees as we do for TMT members, we use the average real hourly wage in
the industry as our proxy for the value of human capital for workers. While controlling
for industry unit labor costs, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to a
narcissist-initiated mass layoff than to that of a non-narcissist when the value of human
capital is high. We infer that the tendency of narcissistic CEOs to undervalue human
capital destroys firm value through the channel of increased mass layoffs in firms with
high levels of human capital. The results for both the likelihood of mass layoffs and the
stock price reaction to mass layoffs of higher-wage employees are parallel to those for the
TMT members, which suggests that CEO narcissism has effects on the human capital of
3Although still not a definitive test, the relation between non-CEO executive turnover and CEO narcis-
sism is weaker when the non-CEO would forfeit more pay if he were to leave the firm. The fact that the
potential pay forfeited upon departure matters is consistent with the proposition that at least a non-trivial
proportion of the departures are voluntary.
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both executive and non-executive employees.
Our work contributes to two important strands of literature. First, we extend the litera-
ture on the effects of CEO psychological traits on firm value. Malmendier and Tate (2015)
review the large finance literature on the effects of CEO optimism and overconfidence.4
Other studies examine the effects of CEOs’ life experiences.5 Though narcissism has been
less studied in finance, Aktas et al. (2016) examine its effects on takeover negotiations and
Ham, Seybert, and Wang (2017) its effects on investment policy and profitability. Kaplan,
Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) examine the effects of several personality traits related to
narcissism. There is also a large literature in management that examines how CEO nar-
cissism relates to firm performance, innovation and other firm actions.6 We add to this
strand of literature by showing a link between CEO narcissism and the turnover of human
capital, and by showing that the degree to which this link impacts firm value depends on
the value of the human capital of the departing employees. To our knowledge, we are the
first to show a link between a CEO psychological trait and the loss of human capital by
firms at both the non-CEO executive level and the broad non-executive employee level, as
well as the associated effects on firm value. Our results complement the large set of extant
results that link CEO psychological traits to other capital (e.g., investment, mergers and
acquisitions, etc.). It is worth emphasizing that there may be off-setting benefits to narcis-
sistic CEOs that make their net contributions to firm value positive despite their negative
effects on human capital; thus, our results about human capital effects should not be taken
to imply that employing narcissistic CEOs is suboptimal.
4A sampling of this literature includes Banerjee et al. (2015) and Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda
(2014), Billett and Qian (2008), Bouwman (2014), cjrs11 Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013), Galasso and
Simcoe (2011), Goel and Thakor (2008), Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh
(2012), Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012), Kolasinski and Li. (2013), mt05; Malmendier and Tate
(2005) and Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Otto (2014), and Roll (1986).
5See bs03 Benmelech and Frydman (2015), Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Malmendier and Nagel
(2011), Xuan (2009), Yim (2013).
6See ch11; Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), Gerstner et al. (2013), wpl13 Patel and Cooper (2014), and
Zhu and Chen (2015a) and Zhu and Chen (2015b).
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Second, we extend the literature on the executive labor market by focusing on the
turnover of non-CEO executives and on the value of their human capital. While there is
an extensive body of research on the causes and consequences of CEO turnover, there is
comparatively much less research on the antecedents and effects of the turnover of non-
CEO executives.7 In the management literature, some early research focused on the rate
of turnover of non-CEO executives, but there has been relatively little work on specific
predictors of individual top manager turnover and the associated valuation effects.8 Here,
we provide evidence that an aspect of the CEO’s personality contributes to non-CEO ex-
ecutive turnover, as well as how it impacts firm value through the human capital channel.
Our finding of more negative stock market reactions to departures of non-CEO executives
with longer tenure from firms led by narcissistic CEOs also sheds light on the value of the
human capital of non-CEO executives.
A potentially important byproduct of our research is the validation of the use of the
ExecuComp database as a tool for future non-CEO executive turnover studies. While
ExecuComp is the most widely used data source for executive compensation research, it
has not been used to study non-CEO executive turnover in part because of concerns about
whether it is an appropriate tool for this task. In our paper, we use hand-collected data to
validate a subsample of turnovers inferred using an algorithm applied to ExecuComp data,
and we thereby demonstrate that non-CEO executive turnover can be studied on a large
scale with an existing database.
4.2 Background and Hypothesis Development
Narcissism is a well-defined and well-studied concept in the fields of social psychology
and organizational behavior. Research in this area classifies narcissism into one of two
7Walsh (1988), Murphy and Zummerman (1999), Parino (1997), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001),
Goyal and Park (2002).
8Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly C. A. (1984), Walsh (1988), Walsh and Ellwood (1991), and Wiersema
and Bantel (1993).
76
types, grandiose or vulnerable, with both demonstrating egocentric tendencies. Either
form of narcissism would suggest a biased valuation of the input of peers or subordinates,
as well as a lack of empathy, but an understanding of the two types helps to pin down the
mechanisms through which CEO narcissism could operate. It is worth noting that a single
narcissist can exhibit both of these two forms of narcissism from time to time.
Grandiose narcissists tend to have a very high self-image or ego. This manifests itself
in numerous ways. Such narcissists tend to be charismatic individuals (Maccoby 2004),
and this charisma causes others to view them positively, at least initially (Carlson, Vazire,
and Tf 2011). They want to have more authority, tend to be more expressive, and view
themselves as superior (Emmons 1987; Raskin and Terry 1988). Grandiose narcissists
overestimate their intelligence and attractiveness (Gabriel, Critelli, and Ee 1994). Often,
they view themselves positively because they are high performers. Grandiose narcissists’
sense of superiority leads them to feel entitled to the admiration and praise of others, and
they tend to react aggressively if they do not get the recognition and praise they feel they
deserve (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). A grandiosely narcissistic CEO, therefore, is less
likely to treat the ideas of others as equal to his own. Such a CEO’s egocentrism causes
him to over-emphasize (in his mind) his own contribution to the firm while discounting
the value of others’ involvement, while at the same time making it difficult for him to
empathize with others (e.g., Maccoby (2004)).
The second type, vulnerable narcissists, need frequent reinforcement of their extremely
positive self-image. This need for reinforcement, often described as “fragility,” has also
been demonstrated in multiple studies. For instance, such narcissists tend to be extremely
sensitive to criticism or slights (Maccoby 2004), and they constantly work to enhance their
own self-esteem (Campbell 1999). If a vulnerable narcissist becomes threatened or his ego
declines, he is more likely to become aggressive (Bushman and Thomaes 2011; Horton
and Sedikides 2009). Vulnerable narcissists tend to over-react to relatively small failures
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and problems (Horton and Sedikides 2009), and their egos are more fragile (Zeigler-Hill,
Myers, and Clark 2010). Although such narcissists are fragile, they are also grandiose
in their self-concept (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001) and have a strong desire to gain self-
enhancement (Wallace and Baumeister 2002). These traits make vulnerable narcissists
lack empathy (e.g., Maccoby (2004)), similarly to grandiose narcissists. These traits also
make a vulnerably narcissistic CEO more likely to take dissenting opinions personally,
rather than treat them as good faith objective disagreements about how to best maximize
firm value. As a result, such a CEO is less capable of impartially incorporating feedback
from others, thereby de-valuing their input. Finally, since vulnerable narcissists share with
the grandiose type the tendency to overestimate their own value, they will also likely under
underestimate the value and contributions of others.
As shown in prior research, both types of narcissists’ high ego, vulnerable narcissists’
fragility, as well as grandiose narcissists’ sense of entitlement to the admiration of oth-
ers, make it difficult for narcissists of either type to work with other competent adults in
teams.9 Thus, we would expect CEO narcissism to create problems within the top man-
agement team (TMT) of a firm. An egocentric CEO who puts excessive stock in his own
contribution to the firm, as in the case of a grandiose narcissist, or who feels threatened
by the skills of his peers, as in the case of a vulnerable narcissist, should be more likely
to fire a TMT member, regardless of the fact that the TMT member might have valuable
ideas or unique abilities. Moreover, we note that a narcissistic CEO of either sort, whose
self-centered personality makes it difficult to empathize with others, is less likely to feel
an internal, social cost to firing a person. In addition, the large ego of a narcissist of either
sort, the constant validation demanded by a vulnerable narcissist, and the entitlement of a
grandiose narcissist make it unpleasant to work for such individuals. The unpleasant work
9See, e.g., Carlson, Naumann, and Vazire (2011), Carlson, Vazire, and Tf (2011), Farwell and Wohlwend-
Lloyd (1998), John and Robins (1994), Maccoby (2003) and Maccoby (2004).
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environment, in turn, could make competent TMT members more likely to leave a firm
voluntarily if the CEO is a narcissist.
Given the greater likelihood that narcissistic CEOs undervalue or feel threatened by
others, and the greater difficulty of working with them, we formulate our first hypothesis:10
Hypothesis 1a: CEO narcissism should be associated with higher TMT Turnover.
Because vulnerable narcissists need positive reinforcement of their self-image, they
tend to feel threatened when others around them are recognized or otherwise perceived as
valuable relative to the CEO (Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd 1998). Within a firm, the pay
of an executive is a measure of how much the firm values that executive. Hence it is likely
that CEOs who are vulnerable narcissists will feel relatively more threatened by other
TMT members who are highly paid relative to them. A grandiose narcissist, on the other
hand, will tend to underestimate the value of other highly paid executives and not take
their ideas seriously, which will make working with a narcissist relatively more unpleasant
for more highly-paid non-CEO executives who presumably have relatively more valuable
ideas. We thus formulate a corollary to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: The effect of CEO narcissism on TMT turnover will be greater if the
TMT member has more prominent (higher) pay relative to the CEO.
Because narcissists of both types lack empathy, narcissistic CEOs will have fewer
emotional qualms in terminating a member of the TMT they perceive as performing poorly,
which should be value increasing if the member indeed has low value. On the other hand,
as narcissists of both types tend to overestimate their own abilities while underestimating
that of others (e.g., Gabriel, Critelli, and Ee (1994)), they will tend to underestimate the
10As we describe later in the discussion of our data and results, the data do not permit us to classify
whether TMT members are involuntarily terminated or depart voluntarily.
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loss of value in human capital when making termination decisions. This could lead to
suboptimal termination decisions. Underestimating the loss of value in human capital
associated with a TMT member departure also means that the narcissistic CEO should be
less likely to attempt to retain a TMT member who threatens to leave voluntarily unless
the difficult working conditions under the narcissistic CEO improve. As with termination,
this could lead to suboptimal decisions to not retain valuable TMT members. We thus
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The effect of CEO narcissism on the stock price reaction to a TMT
member departure will be more negative when the TMT member’s human capital value is
higher.
The hypotheses above relate to members of a firm’s top management team. We next
develop hypotheses about a firms’ lower-level employees. Except for it being unpleasant
to work with a narcissistic CEO, the effects discussed for TMT members should also op-
erate at lower levels of employees, albeit at a broader level. Moreover, it seems plausible
that when a CEO is contemplating a mass layoff of a firm’s employees due to poor perfor-
mance or the need to restructure, greater empathy for the firm’s employees will, all else
equal, reduce the likelihood that the CEO decides to implement the layoff. Thus, a lack of
empathy and an underestimation of lower-level employees’ value should make narcissistic
CEOs of either sort more willing to initiate mass layoffs of non-executive workers, leading
us to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Narcissistic CEOs are more likely to initiate mass layoffs of non-executive
workers, and such decisions should depend less on poor firm performance.
As discussed above in the context of TMT members, however, the tendency for nar-
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cissists of either sort to undervalue others will likely lead to their underestimating the
potential human capital cost of layoffs. As a result, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 4: The effect of CEO narcissism on the stock price reaction to a layoff
announcement will depend on the value of the human capital of the workers being laid
off. Specifically, narcissism will have a more negative effect for layoffs of employees with
higher value human capital.
4.3 Sample Selection, Data and Construction of Variables
To generate our sample, we begin with the population of firms covered in the Com-
pustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database. We utilize two sources of data to
construct our measure of executive narcissism: (i) The Wall Street Transcript (twst.com)
interview transcripts; and (ii) conference call transcripts available from Lexis-Nexis. Both
have been used in prior studies of CEO narcissism (e.g. Aktas et al. (2016), Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007)). The Wall Street Transcript dataset begins in 1997, while the Lexis-
Nexis conference call transcript database starts in 2001; thus, our analysis sample begins
in 1997. Given the construction of our primary measure of TMT turnover and its look-
ahead verification requirement (discussed below), the analysis sample ends in 2009. We
obtain dates of mass non-executive worker layoff announcements from Ravenpack, and
data on industry-level unit labor costs and real wages from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. We obtain dates of news of non-CEO executive departures from firms’ 8-K filings.
Stock price and return data are from CRSP. Other control variables are collected from the
BoardEx and Compustat databases. Given variable construction and sample requirements,
our final estimation sample uses roughly 1,800 firms and includes over 11,000 non-CEO
executives with over 3,500 turnover events and over 2,200 CEOs. We next discuss our
variables in more detail.
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4.3.1 CEO Narcissism
Prior studies in the finance literature use one of two measures of CEO narcissism: the
size of the signature in the annual report (Ham, Seybert, and Wang 2017) or the ratio of
first person singular to the sum of first person singular and first person plural pronouns
computed from analysis of CEO speech (Aktas et al. 2016), while studies in management
use others. We use the pronoun ratio for three primary reasons. First, to our knowledge,
pronoun usage is the only unobtrusive narcissism measure proposed in prior research in
any discipline that has been validated against direct, clinical measures of narcissism, such
as the Narcissism Personality Index (NPI) (Foster and Campbell 2007; Raskin and Shaw
1988). Furthermore, linguistic usage in general has been found in the psychology litera-
ture to be an accurate way of measuring personality traits (Pennebaker and King 1999).
Second, only the pronoun measure can be constructed using machine-readable data for a
sample as large as ours. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we note that only the first
person pronoun ratio in a CEO’s speech is under the CEO’s unilateral control (we only in-
clude the unscripted Q&A portion of the conference calls), whereas alternative measures
of narcissism can plausibly be determined or influenced by others. The measure based
on the CEO’s signature size in the annual report, along with other measures used outside
of Finance, such as the differential in CEO compensation relative to other executives, the
prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the annual report,11 and personal mentions of the
CEO in company reports (e.g. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007)), all potentially reflect the
decisions or inputs of others. Our narcissism measure, like all others employed in CEO
studies, cannot distinguish between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism. However, our
hypotheses make identical predictions about the effects of both types of narcissism, so our
inability to distinguish between the types is not a significant drawback in our context.
11The photograph size measure cannot be constructed for a large sample from machine-readable data.
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We construct the CEO pronoun usage ratio from transcripts of conference calls and
unscripted interviews. Neither interview transcripts from The Wall Street Transcripts nor
conference call transcripts from Lexis-Nexis have linking variables to the ExecuComp
dataset. For both sources, we apply the Levenshtein algorithm to link CEO names in Ex-
ecuComp to speaker names in the interview and conference call samples. This algorithm
computes the distance between strings by calculating the number of changes required to be
made to one string variable to make it equal to another. Below are examples using actual
names of CEOs in our data:
“Nigel Travis” and “Nigel Travis” has a match score of 0 (perfect match)
“Steven Cooper” and “Steve Cooper” have a match score of 1
“David King” and “Dave King” have a match score of 2
“William Merritt” and “William Moffitt” have a match score of 3
“David Singer” and “Arvind Sanger” have a match score of 4
As demonstrated by the above, match quality deteriorates substantially as distances
grow past one. In the reported results, we include all matches with a score of zero or one.
Untabulated results show that the inference from our main results is the same when the
sample is expanded to include matches with scores equal to two or three. We drop observa-
tions where CEO narcissism is not observed (that is, we do not observe CEO participation
in the conference call or in a Wall Street Transcript interview) – this is the primary source
of observation loss in our study.
Once we match transcripts with each CEO, we compute the ratio of the number of
first person singular to the sum of first person singular and first person plural pronouns
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uttered by the CEO in each transcript. We are careful to separate the CEO’s speech from
that of interviewers, analysts and other executives participating in a conference call. For
each point in time in the data, the CEO’s narcissism is the mean pronoun ratio over all
transcripts matched to the CEO up through that time period, weighted by the total number
of words in each transcript. Our sample mean raw narcissism score is 0.184, which is
similar to the mean pronoun-ratio scores of previous studies (e.g. Chatterjee and Hambrick
(2007) and Aktas et al. (2016))., with a standard deviation of 0.08. The distribution of raw
narcissism is highly skewed, however, so we transform it by adding a positive constant
and taking the natural logarithm. The constant is chosen such that the skewness of the
transformed variable is as close to zero as possible, and the transformation is defined for
all observations. Finally, to ease interpretation, we standardize the transformed variable
by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Reported
statistics for narcissism use this transformed and standardized variable.
4.3.2 Top Management Turnover and Mass Layoffs
In principle, we wish to define turnover as a dummy variable equal to one for observa-
tions where a non-CEO top manager leaves the firm, and zero otherwise. We thus need to
identify as precisely as possible when a manager leaves a firm. Given the large size of our
executive pool, we rely on automated methods using data from the ExecuComp database.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require firms to report their top
five wage earners in each fiscal year, though some voluntarily disclose the pay for more
than just the top five. ExecuComp records the individuals listed in the compensation table
in the firm’s proxy statement. The major challenge with using this data source to identify
turnover is the possibility that an executive may disappear from the compensation table
not because he leaves the firm, but because he is no longer one of the top five highest paid
executives. For approximately one-third of the executives who disappear from a given firm
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in ExecuComp, there is no ambiguity because we can use the leftco variable (defined as
the date the manager left the company) in the database to determine precisely which year
the executive leaves.
To measure turnover of a top manager who has a missing leftco value, we develop
a definition based on other data from the ExecuComp database. We first estimate the
proportion of executives in ExecuComp who disappear from the top five in a given year
and then reappear in a subsequent year, which would indicate that not appearing in the
compensation table is not equivalent to exit. Of the non-CEO executives who disappear
from the compensation table and are later observed at that same firm, 36.4% are gone for
only one year, 84.7% are gone for no more than three years, and 93.8% are gone for no
more than five years.
Given the proportions of disappearance and reappearance, we then establish a rule to
define turnovers based on the number of consecutive years that an executive is absent from
the top five data after dropping out of it. There is a clear trade-off in choosing the number
of consecutive years that we require. Because our measure of turnover is forward-looking
for every year, we lose our ability to use the future year in our subsequent analysis. Our
data on top-five wage earners extends through 2012, so requiring three years of forward-
looking data means that we must end our main analysis sample at 2009. If we were to
require five years of forward-looking data to confirm turnover, we would have to end our
main analysis sample at 2007, which would lead to the loss of two additional sample years.
Thus, if we require more years of subsequent absence from the top-five before classifying
an executive as turned over, we minimize instances where we classify a disappearance
from the top-five compensation as a turnover, when it is really just a rotation in the most
highly compensated individuals. But, the cost is that we must shorten our sample period
to allow observation of the longer period of subsequent years. If we require fewer years
of subsequent absence from the top five, we lose accuracy but we can use a longer sample
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period. Our subjective weighing of the costs and benefits leads us to classify a turnover
event as all instances in which an executive leaves the firm’s reported top earners list and
does not reappear in the list by the third year.
To assess the validity of our turnover definition, we randomly select a sample of 50
turnover events fitting the definition, and hand-verify whether or not the executive had
actually left the company using the more detailed executive lists that firms provide in their
10-Ks, supplemented with Internet searches of news items, LinkedIn, and similar sources.
Our ExecuComp-based approach correctly identifies turnover in over 90% of the cases.
Given potential remaining concerns about the algorithm, we also verify that our tabulated
results are robust to different variations of our turnover classification by re-running our
analyses (not shown) using definitions of turnover that range from disappearing from the
top executive list from one to four years.
To further assess robustness, we run additional analyses, not shown, that use a much
more stringent definition of turnover. Specifically, we collect all of the executive titles
in ExecuComp (over 30,000 variations) and re-code those titles into one of 14 categories
following work by Graffin et al. (2008). Based on these new titles, we then classify an
event as an executive turnover only if a particular executive with a given title does not
appear in the subsequent year, but someone else holding that same title code does appear.
This approach only works in situations in which the executive’s title code is unique (e.g.
“Chief Financial Officer”). Events with non-unique title codes are right-censored in this
analysis unless turnover is verified with the leftco variable provided by ExecuComp. If
an executive with a unique title code leaves the firm’s data in the same year that a new
executive with the same title code enters, we define the former as having left the firm.
Because this test requires unique title codes, it reduces our number of observed turnovers
by roughly 900. When we count as turnover only these events, however, our results are
unchanged from those tabulated.
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For testing the hypotheses that link CEO narcissism and mass layoffs of lower-level
employees, we need to identify firm layoffs. We obtain the firm identities and dates of
mass layoffs over the 1997-2012 period from the Ravenpack database. Sources include
Dow Jones Newswires, the Wall Street Journal, and Barron’s. Using article similarity
tags provided by RavenPack, we are able to identify not only the event date of a layoff
announcement, but also whether the company has had any mention of a layoff over the last
three months, across all news services tracked by the company. Only the first mention of
each layoff is included in our analysis.
4.3.3 Relative Pay of the non-CEO Executive
Our hypothesis 1b is that a given executive’s pay relative to the CEO will amplify the
relation between narcissism and TMT turnover. We measure executive pay prominence
using the difference between the CEO’s salary and bonus pay and the TMT member’s
salary and bonus pay. We do not rely on stock grants or option grants (or associated option
exercises) in compensation because such components are much lumpier through time than
are salary and bonus. To normalize magnitudes across firms, we divide this difference
by the TMT member’s pay. We then use the log transform on the pay gap ratio due to
skewness in the data that is generated by a handful of outlier CEOs (e.g. Steve Jobs); our
results are similar when we winsorize the data instead of using a log transform.
The size of the gap in pay between the CEO and other TMT members could plausibly
be partially driven by industry factors. For example, in more complex industries, where
the CEO is expected to have a broader skill set, one would expect a general tendency for
a higher pay gap. Thus, we adjust the log-transformed pay gap measure by the average
industry log pay gap for executives with the same title using four-digit NAICS codes to
classify industries. Finally, we take the negative of this number to ease in interpretation:
higher numbers indicate pay closer to the CEO’s pay level (thus greater prominence). For
87
example, for firm i in industry j, the CFO’s pay prominence is given as:
Pay prominence for CFOi
= −
{
log
(
CEO payi − CFO payi
CFO payi
)
− 1|J |
∑
j∈J
log
(
CEO payj − CFO payj
CFO payj
)}
4.3.4 Announcement Returns to TMT Departures and Mass Layoffs
For some of our tests, we examine how narcissism is related to announcement returns
to two types of events: a non-CEO TMT member’s departure and mass layoffs. We obtain
announcement dates for TMT departures by searching firms’ 8Ks for the TMT member’s
name during the year of the departure. We then read the 8K to verify that it announces
the TMT member’s departure. Upon such verification, we search Factiva for all stories in
the press mentioning the executive’s name in the month prior to the 8K filing to ensure
there are no prior reports in the news of the departure. To ensure that the announcement
returns are not driven by other events, we only include observations for which the 8K
does not announce any additional information and for which there is no other news for the
firm. For the purposes of searching for an announcement date for specific TMT departures,
we randomly draw (without replacement) TMT departures identified through ExecuComp
(using the procedure described above) until we obtain a sample of 100 uncontaminated
announcement dates.12 Randomly drawing and manually checking 462 8Ks netted 150
8Ks that unambiguously announced the departure of a TMT member. Of those 150 8Ks, 50
contained contaminating information not clearly related to the departure announcement,
leaving a sample of 100 8Ks that announced the departure of a TMT member with no
potentially confounding information. For the mass layoff announcement dates, we use the
12We lose one observation due to the unavailability of some control variables.
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aforementioned dates from Ravenpack.
For each event, we compute the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day win-
dow centered on the event day based on the market model, with the parameters estimated
over the prior 60 months and the CRSP value-weighted index as our proxy for the market
portfolio.
4.3.5 Value of Human Capital and Unit Labor Costs
All else equal, the longer that a non-CEO executive has remained with the company,
the more likely the executive is to have amassed a large amount of potentially valuable
firm-specific human capital. We therefore use tenure with their current firm, as reported in
ExecuComp, as a proxy for non-CEO TMT members’ levels of human capital.
Data on the tenure of non-executive employees is not publicly available, so we cannot
use tenure in our analysis of the mass layoffs. Instead, we appeal to microeconomic theory
to argue that the wage an employee makes should, at a first order approximation, be equal
to the marginal product of his labor. Hence, we can use wages as a proxy for the value of
human capital. Average wages are not publicly available at the firm level, so we instead
use the average real wage for the four-digit NAICS industry in the current year, as reported
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Since we relate average real wages to market reactions to layoffs, it is important that
the firm’s total labor costs do not confound our inferences. That is, a firm might initiate
layoffs because its labor costs are high, and labor costs might be high because industry
wages are high. To isolate the human capital value of labor from total labor costs, we also
obtain from the Bureau of Labor Statistics unit labor costs for each industry, which is the
total wage bill per dollar of output in the industry. We use this unit labor cost measure as a
control variable in all regressions that use the average industry real wage as a test variable.
The distributions of both the average industry real wage and total industry real unit
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labor costs are highly skewed. We thus transform both these variables by adding a positive
constant and taking the natural logarithm. In each case, we choose the constant term such
that the resulting transformed variable has skewness as close to zero as possible.
4.3.6 Control Variables
Executive Controls. The past performance of a firm over an executive’s tenure may in-
fluence that executive’s turnover at the firm. If the value of a firm’s stock declines over the
executive’s tenure, all else equal, one might expect an increased likelihood of management
turnover. We therefore control for the firm’s total buy-and-hold stock return over the exec-
utive’s tenure at the firm. Executive turnover at narcissist-run firms could either be due to
CEOs who terminate executives or to executives who choose to leave working under a nar-
cissistic CEO. Hence, we control for executive age and sex (obtained from ExecuComp)
and number of outside directorships (num. directorships, taken from BoardEx) to account
for any differences in labor market opportunities that might contribute to an executive’s
decision to exit the company voluntarily. Since the departure of the most senior members
of the TMT may have different implications for the firm, we include indicator variables for
whether ExecuComp designates the executive as chief financial officer (CFO) or chief op-
erating officer (COO). We control for total cash compensation as reported in ExecuComp
because more highly compensated TMT members likely have a stronger incentive to stay
with the firm. We control for whether the executive is also on the board (board member),
since executives with board seats are plausibly more difficult to remove and/or more re-
luctant to leave. Finally, we control for the value of the executive’s cumulative unvested
compensation (pay on table) as reported in ExecuComp because having high unvested
compensation would plausibly make an executive less likely to voluntarily leave.
Firm-level Controls. We control for several firm characteristics that are likely to be cor-
related with turnover and layoff decisions: firm size (log of total assets); return on assets or
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ROA (the ratio current period net income to beginning-of-period total assets); the market-
to-book ratio (the market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets as of
the end of the prior year); and contemporaneous sales growth. In addition, since changes
in firm strategy may drive either TMT turnover or layoffs, we control for the absolute
year-over-year change in advertising intensity and change in research and development
intensity (where intensity is the ratio of the relevant expense to total sales), as well as the
absolute year-over-year change in financial leverage (total debt to total assets) and number
of acquisitions made by the firm in the prior year, as reported by Thomson One. Layoffs
can be triggered not only by poor firm-specific performance, but also by industry-wide de-
clines in profitability. Therefore, we control for industry ROA, defined as the median ROA
for all firms in the same 4-digit NAICs code. In some alternative specifications, we control
for firm and industry performance with the number of consecutive quarters in which ei-
ther industry ROA or firm ROA has been negative up to and including the current quarter.
All of the above variables, unless otherwise indicated, are constructed from Compustat
data. Since the CEO’s Optimism (alternatively called “overconfidence” in other studies)
can plausibly impact layoffs, we control for it using the text-based measure of Aktas et al.
(2016), which we construct using the same transcripts we use to construct our measure of
CEO narcissism. Finally, since narcissists crave external accolades, we control for CEO
Awards, as constructed by Boivie, Graffin, and Gentry (2016). It is defined as the number
of times a CEO has been given special recognition by Forbes, BusinessWeek, Chief Exec-
utive Management, Industry Week, Institutional Investor, or Worth magazine over the past
five years.
4.3.7 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for our panel of non-CEO executive-firm-year observations, our
sample of TMT turnover events, our firm-year sample, and our sample of mass layoffs are,
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respectively, in tables 4.1-4.6. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles to attempt to ensure outliers do not drive our results. In all panels, because it
has been standardized, our narcissism measure has a mean close to zero and a standard
deviation close to one. In tables 4.1 and 4.2, we see that the average non-CEO executive
has been at the firm for around five years and has cash compensation around $500,000
per year. The large majority of TMT members have no outside directorships. Only 8%
are women. The firm-level variables are largely in line with what has been reported in
other studies of larger firms similar to those in our sample. In tables 4.3 and 4.4 we see
that the average announcement return to a TMT departure is negative and economically
large, 0.36%, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is also
considerable cross-sectional variation in the CAR, as indicated by a standard deviation of
4.37 percentage points. In table 4.5 we see that layoffs are relatively rare, occurring in
only 3.6% of firm-year observations in the panel. Finally, in table 4.6, we see that the
mean stock price reaction to layoff news is 0.79%, and it is statistically different from zero
(p=0.006). This result suggests that on average markets infer from layoff announcements
bad news about future firm performance, as it seems implausible that layoffs themselves
destroy value on average. Mean firm-level ROA is larger than the mean of our industry
ROA measure because our sample consists of large firms, which tend to have higher-than-
average profitability.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for TMT Turnover (Executive Level)
This table reports descriptive statistics for the executive level observations used in predicting top man-
agement team (TMT) turnover. All variables are described in the text. CEO Narcissism is a stan-
dardized and de-skewed text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person
singular pronouns to first-person pronouns used in CEO speech; we standardize it in all regressions.
Pay prominence is the closeness of TMT member pay to CEO pay, relative to industry norms based
on the TMT member’s role. Pay on table is the ratio of unvested compensation to total compensation.
P25, P50, and P75 are, respectively, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev P25 P50 P75
CEO narcissism 0.0043 1.0035 -0.6189 0.0127 0.6469
TMT Tenure 5.1499 3.3487 3.0000 4.0000 7.0000
Pay prominence -0.0111 0.8307 -0.2149 0.0000 0.1905
Pay on table 0.9859 1.9870 0.0000 0.2805 1.0637
Num directorships 0.0910 0.2504 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CFO 0.1070 0.3091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
COO 0.0130 0.1132 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age 50.8585 6.9410 46.0000 51.0000 56.0000
Sex 0.0819 0.2742 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cash compensation 493.4485 393.8862 292.9730 398.4750 556.6250
Board member 0.1130 0.3166 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Return over tenure -0.0325 0.9446 -0.3059 -0.2047 -0.0098
CEO optimism 0.4716 0.3444 0.0000 0.5500 0.7500
CEO awards 0.1182 0.4920 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 32347
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for TMT Turnover (Firm Level)
This table reports descriptive statistics for the firm level observations used in predicting top manage-
ment team (TMT) turnover. All variables are described in the text. P25, P50, and P75 are, respectively,
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev P25 P50 P75
ROA 0.0358 0.1092 0.0128 0.0454 0.0832
Ind. ROA 0.0004 0.0822 0.0009 0.0187 0.0371
Market to book 1.8023 1.0964 1.1097 1.4587 2.0752
log(total assets) 7.6342 1.6472 6.4624 7.5422 8.6769
Change in leverage 0.0454 0.0644 0.0055 0.0236 0.0581
Sales growth 0.0955 0.2419 -0.0132 0.0717 0.1672
Advertising intensity 0.0040 0.0087 0.0005 0.0014 0.0037
R&D intensity 0.0245 0.1143 0.0001 0.0023 0.0118
Num acquisitions 0.8323 1.6089 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Observations 32347
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for TMT CAR Regressions (Executive Level)
This panel reports descriptive statistics for the executive level observations used in predicting cumu-
lative abnormal returns surrounding TMT departures; the observations constitute a random subsample
from panel A. All variables are described in the text. CEO Narcissism is a standardized and de-skewed
text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person singular pronouns to
first-person pronouns used in CEO speech; we standardize it in all regressions. Pay prominence is the
closeness of TMT member pay to CEO pay, relative to industry norms based on the TMT member’s
role. Pay on table is the ratio of unvested compensation to total compensation. P25, P50, and P75 are,
respectively, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
CAR -0.3605 4.3722 -2.3589 -0.1599 2.0438
CEO narcissism 0.0000 1.0000 -0.7134 -0.1116 0.5992
Tenure 3.0707 1.6241 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000
Pay prominence 1.9042 0.1074 1.8377 1.8859 1.9736
Pay on table 0.4110 1.5692 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097
Num directorships 0.0642 0.2233 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CFO 0.3434 0.4773 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
COO 0.1212 0.3280 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Age 50.2727 7.9678 44.0000 50.0000 56.0000
Sex 0.0505 0.2201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cash compensation 262.1513 185.8729 142.6580 247.6360 321.0940
Return over tenure 0.3453 1.3583 -0.3577 0.0427 0.6032
CEO optimism 0.5181 0.3136 0.2759 0.6154 0.7692
CEO awards 0.0909 0.4064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 99
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for TMT CAR Regressions (Firm Level)
This panel reports descriptive statistics for the firm level observations used in predicting cumulative
abnormal returns surrounding TMT departures; the observations constitute a random subsample from
panel A. All variables are described in the text. CEO Narcissism is a standardized and de-skewed
text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person singular pronouns to
first-person pronouns used in CEO speech; we standardize it in all regressions. Pay prominence is the
closeness of TMT member pay to CEO pay, relative to industry norms based on the TMT member’s
role. Pay on table is the ratio of unvested compensation to total compensation. P25, P50, and P75 are,
respectively, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
ROA 0.0404 0.0736 0.0111 0.0376 0.0743
Ind. ROA 0.0237 0.0332 0.0090 0.0212 0.0379
Market to book 1.7082 1.0950 1.0706 1.2831 1.9547
log(total assets) 7.2677 1.7599 5.8301 7.0129 8.4433
Change in leverage 0.0392 0.0563 0.0027 0.0214 0.0538
Sales growth 0.0469 0.2856 -0.0918 0.0277 0.1739
Num acquisitions 0.6465 1.5539 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Advertising intensity 0.0022 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009
R&D intensity 0.0053 0.0120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023
Observations 99
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Mass Layoff Regressions
This panel reports descriptive statistics for the observations used in predicting the announcement of
a mass layoff at a firm. All variables are described in the text. CEO Narcissism is a standardized
and de-skewed text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person singular
pronouns to first-person pronouns used in CEO speech; we standardize it in all regressions. Real hourly
wage is the average hourly wage for the firm’s industry. The variable #(ROA< 0) is the consecutive
number of quarters of negative return on assets sustained by the firm; #(Ind. ROA < 0) is the industry
analog. Standard errors cluster on industry. P25, P50, and P75 are, respectively, the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
Layoff annoucement 0.0358 0.1857 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CEO narcissism -0.0000 1.0000 -0.5703 0.0076 0.6153
ROA 0.0111 0.0254 0.0034 0.0128 0.0235
Ind. ROA 0.0015 0.0207 0.0000 0.0058 0.0111
#(ROA < 0) 0.5499 1.6348 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
#(Ind. ROA < 0) 4.1504 3.8426 0.0000 3.0000 9.0000
Real hourly wage 2.7126 0.4788 2.4167 2.7092 3.0094
CEO optimism 0.3738 0.3676 0.0000 0.3837 0.7027
CEO awards 0.1343 0.5743 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Market to book 2.9337 2.6551 1.4660 2.1890 3.4044
log(total assets) 7.5285 1.6030 6.3625 7.4429 8.5694
Change in leverage 0.0177 0.0298 0.0013 0.0075 0.0205
Sales growth 0.0333 0.1864 -0.0470 0.0231 0.0971
Num acquisitions 0.1374 0.4056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unit labor cost -0.5932 0.1563 -0.7147 -0.5881 -0.4715
Observations 41565
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics for Mass Layoff CAR
This panel reports descriptive statistics for the observations used in predicting the cumulative abnormal
return surrounding a mass layoff announcement. All variables are described in the text. CEO Narcis-
sism is a standardized and de-skewed text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio
of first-person singular pronouns to first-person pronouns used in CEO speech; we standardize it in all
regressions. Real hourly wage is the average hourly wage for the firm’s industry. P25, P50, and P75
are, respectively, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
CAR -0.7881 10.4562 -4.5888 -0.4194 3.6289
CEO narcissism -0.0000 1.0000 -0.5346 0.0096 0.6540
ROA -0.0021 0.0627 -0.0022 0.0079 0.0186
Ind. ROA -0.0035 0.0244 -0.0045 0.0031 0.0083
CEO optimism 0.3700 0.3728 0.0000 0.3810 0.6923
CEO awards 0.3722 1.0899 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
log(total assets) 8.1131 1.7705 6.7098 7.9063 9.4532
Market to book 2.7831 3.2416 1.2359 1.8821 3.0402
Change in leverage 0.0200 0.0327 0.0022 0.0090 0.0243
Sales growth -0.0065 0.1716 -0.0868 -0.0046 0.0643
Real hourly wage 2.7781 0.4014 2.5444 2.7822 2.9985
Num acquisitions 0.1729 0.4871 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unit labor cost 0.2105 0.0821 0.1399 0.2182 0.2717
Observations 1064
4.4 Tests and Results
Testing the hypotheses discussed in section 4.2 require examining the relation between
narcissism and the following: the hazard rate of top management turnover, the stock price
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reaction to news of departures of non-CEO top managers, the odds of a mass layoffs, and
the stock price reaction to news of mass layoffs. Below we discuss results for each set of
tests.
4.4.1 Hazard Rate of TMT Turnover
To test our first hypothesis on the relation between CEO narcissism and executive
turnover (Hypothesis 1a), we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model that predicts the
executive’s departure as a function of the CEO’s narcissism and many control variables:
h(i, t) = h0(t)exp(β1CEO Narcissismi,t + γ′Controlsi,t) (4.1)
where h(i, t) is the departure hazard of executive i who has been part of the TMT for
t years and h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate corresponding to t. Controls is the vector
of all the firm, CEO and executive-level control variables discussed in the prior section.
We estimate the above equation using partial likelihood with standard errors clustered by
CEO. Hence, our results are robust to arbitrary error correlation across executive-year ob-
servations with the same CEO in charge. Instead of coefficients, we report the exponential
of each parameter estimate, which can be interpreted as proportional hazard ratios. Thus,
if a variable increases (decreases) the likelihood of a TMT member departure, the hazard
ratio will be significantly greater (less) than 1.0. Recall that Hypothesis 1a predicts that
CEO narcissism is associated with an increase in the hazard of TMT turnover, implying
that the hazard ratio for CEO narcissism should be greater than 1.0.
Results of the hazard regressions are in table 4.7. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, the
coefficient on CEO Narcissism is statistically significant across the specifications and its
exponential is greater than 1.0. Using the most complete specification in column (4),
the proportional hazard ratio is 1.066. Since narcissism has been standardized, the point
estimate implies that increasing CEO narcissism from one standard deviation below the
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mean to one standard deviation above increases the departure hazard rate by a factor of
1.136 [1.136 = 1.06622], or 13.6%.
We also predict that the effect of narcissism on TMT turnover will be larger when
the value of a non-CEO executive is perceived and recognized more highly by the firm
(hypothesis 1b). As discussed in section 4.3, we use the executive’s pay prominence as
our measure of such perceived value. We test hypothesis 1b by estimating another Cox
hazard model identical to equation (4.1) above, except that we also include an interaction
of CEO Narcissism with pay prominence.
The results of our interaction specification are in column (2) of table 4.7. Supporting
hypothesis 1b, the results show that higher pay prominence amplifies the effect of CEO
narcissism on the likelihood a TMT member’s turnover, and the effect is statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level. In addition, the direct effect of narcissism remains significant in this
specification, with a p-value of 0.009 and a hazard ratio point estimate of 1.055. To ease
the economic interpretation of the interaction term coefficients, all interacted continuous
variables have been standardized in all specifications. Thus the product of the exponen-
tials of the coefficients on the direct effect and the interaction term imply that, when an
executive has pay prominence one standard deviation above the mean, the marginal effect
of a standard deviation increase in narcissism is to increase the hazard of the executive’s
turnover by a factor of 1.15 [1.15 = 1.055 ∗ 1.088]. This effect is large in an absolute
sense, as well as relative to 1.055, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in CEO
narcissism on the turnover hazard when the executive’s pay prominence is at the mean.
News reports and 8K filings that disclose the departure of TMT members do not gen-
erally provide sufficient information to tell whether a departure is voluntary or involuntary
(i.e., a termination). Nevertheless, to try to get a sense of whether CEO narcissism-induced
TMT turnover is voluntary for a significant part of the sample, we examine how the rela-
tion between narcissism and turnover is related to pay on table. We define this variable
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Table 4.7: TMT Turnover Prediction
This table shows the estimation results to equation (4.1) in the paper. The likelihood of turnover for
a non-CEO top management team (TMT) member in a given year is modeled via a Cox proportional
hazards function, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the TMT Member leaves the firm
and 0 otherwise. The baseline hazard of turnover is a function of the tenure of the TMT member;
the covariates shown below increase or decrease the turnover risk. All variables are described in the
text. A hazard ratio (exponentiated beta coefficient) over 1 indicates increased turnover likelihood, a
hazard ratio below 1 indicates decreased likelihood. CEO Narcissism is a standardized and de-skewed
text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person singular pronouns to
first-person pronouns used in CEO speech (conference calls and interviews). Pay prominence is the
closeness of TMT member pay to CEO pay, relative to industry norms based on the TMT member’s
role. Pay on table is the ratio of unvested compensation to total compensation. Standard errors cluster
on the CEO, p-values are reported below the hazard ratios. The labels *, **, and *** denote p-values
less than .01, .05, and .01, respectively. Coefficients on control variables are not reported for brevity.
CEO narcissism 1.042** 1.051** 1.062*** 1.038* 1.066***
(0.043) (0.014) (0.007) (0.081) (0.005)
... x Pay prominence 1.074*** 1.072***
(0.008) (0.009)
... x Pay on table 0.981** 0.982**
(0.040) (0.041)
... x ROA 1.101 1.122
(0.580) (0.502)
... x Ind. ROA 0.971 0.955
(0.896) (0.842)
Pay prominence 0.922*** 0.905*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.905***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Pay on table 1.027 1.027 1.028 1.027 1.027
(0.255) (0.251) (0.234) (0.258) (0.242)
ROA 1.023 1.020 1.023 1.022 1.020
(0.299) (0.348) (0.290) (0.311) (0.358)
Ind. ROA 1.007 1.007 1.006 1.007 1.006
(0.781) (0.787) (0.802) (0.774) (0.800)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
N 32347 32347 32347 32347 32347
Num executives 11480 11480 11480 11480 11480
Num turnovers 3563 3563 3563 3563 3563
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as the dollar value of unvested compensation that a TMT member would forgo should he
leave.13 If a significant number of TMT turnovers induced by CEO narcissism are vol-
untary, we would expect the response of TMT turnover to CEO narcissism to be weaker
when pay on table is larger. We thus run another specification, identical to equation 4.1,
except we include the standardized pay on table and its interaction with CEO Narcissism
as independent variables. Our point estimate of coefficient on the interaction implies a
significant negative relation (p-value = 0.065). The exponential of this coefficient is 0.981,
whereas the exponential of the direct effect of CEO narcissism is 1.064. These results
imply that when pay left on the table is at its mean, a standard deviation increase in CEO
narcissism increases the departure hazard rate by a factor of 1.064. However, when pay
on table increases by a standard deviation, the effect of narcissism on the departure hazard
declines to 1.04 [1.04 = 1.064 ∗ 0.981]. Since pay left on the table significantly alters the
effect of CEO Narcissism on turnover hazard, we conclude that a non-trivial number of
CEO narcissism-induced TMT departures are voluntary. We caution the reader, however,
that we cannot infer from this result whether the majority of narcissism-induced TMT
departures are voluntary.
We also examine whether the effect of narcissism on the turnover hazard changes with
firm and industry performance. We thus run a specification identical to equation (4.1), ex-
cept that we include interactions of narcissism with both industry and firm ROA. The inter-
action terms are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In a specification that includes
all of the interaction terms used in prior specifications (including with pay prominence
and pay on table), all of our inferences remain unchanged, and the stand-alone effect of
narcissism is largest in magnitude.
13We say could forgo because we cannot observe severance agreements for TMT members.
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4.4.2 Stock Price Reaction to TMT Departures
We next turn our attention to stock market reactions to news of TMT turnover events.
Recall that we predict that the effect of narcissism on the market’s reaction to the news
of TMT turnover depends on the value of the executive’s firm-specific human capital, for
which we use the executive’s tenure as a proxy. We thus estimate the following equation
using weighted least squares for the sample of turnover events:
CARi = α+β1CEO Narcissismi+β2CEO Narcissismi×Tenurei+γ′Controlsi+i (4.2)
Where CARi the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day window around event
i and controls include the same variables as in the hazard regressions. The weight for each
observation is the inverse of the standard forecast error associated with each cumulative
abnormal return from a market model. The weighting scheme assigns more weight to
observations where the CAR is estimated more precisely, and should adjust the regression
residuals toward being homoscedastic. Nevertheless, we compute White robust standard
errors.
Our estimates of parameters and p-values from equation (4.2) are in table 3. We in-
clude specifications with one interaction term at a time (in columns 2-5), as well as a spec-
ification that includes all interactions at the same time (column 6). In the most complete
specification (column 6), the coefficient on narcissism is significantly positive (p-value =
0.015) and economically large at 1.984. This result implies that news of a non-CEO exec-
utive departure produces a CAR of 1.984 percentage points larger when CEO narcissism
increases one standard deviation above the mean. In a Cox hazard model, the time since
the executive began their position is absorbed in the baseline hazard; there is no equivalent
feature in the OLS regressions that we use for the cumulative abnormal returns. We thus
103
interact CEO narcissism with the tenure of the TMT member to assess whether the effects
differ as a function of how long the TMT member has been in his position. The coefficient
on the interaction term is significantly negative (p-value = 0.009). The point estimate of
0.797 implies that, for every additional year the departing TMT member has been with
the firm, the effect of CEO narcissism on the CAR is less positive by 0.797 percentage
points. The two coefficient estimates taken together imply that the effect of a one standard
deviation increase in CEO narcissism on the announcement return becomes negative once
a TMT member has been with the firm approximately 2.5 years or more. These results
support Hypothesis 2: the effect of narcissism-induced TMT turnover on firm value is
negative when human capital levels are high. To ensure that normal retirements are not
driving our results, we run a similar specification wherein we drop all observations where
TMT members are older than 62. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to
those reported.
Although the positive coefficient on the direct effect of narcissism on TMT departure
announcement returns is consistent with CEO narcissism having a positive effect on firm
value when it induces the turnover of TMT members with short tenure, it is also consistent
with an alternative hypothesis. It is well-established that narcissists do not work well
with others, so under a narcissistic CEO, TMT departures are potentially more likely to be
driven by interpersonal conflicts. If investors are aware of such conflicts and if the conflicts
adversely impact firm performance, the market could greet as good news the departure of a
TMT member involved in such a conflict with the CEO, even if the conflict were totally the
fault of the narcissistic CEO. If the CEO’s narcissism caused the conflict in the first place,
we should not conclude that the resulting positive association of CEO narcissism with
turnover announcement returns indicates that CEO narcissism creates value by inducing
such turnover. Hence, we cannot infer from the positive direct effect that CEO narcissism
increases firm value by making the departure of short-tenure TMT members more likely.
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Table 4.8: TMT Announcement Returns
This table shows the estimation results to equation (4.2) in the paper using weighted least squares.
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the firm over a three day window. CEO
Narcissism is a standardized and de-skewed text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from
the ratio of first-person singular pronouns to first-person pronouns used in CEO speech (conference
calls and interviews). Pay prominence is the closeness of TMT member pay to CEO pay, relative to
industry norms based on the TMT member’s role. Pay on table is the ratio of unvested compensation
to total compensation. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, p-values are reported below
the coefficients. The labels *, **, and *** denote p-values less than .01, .05, and .01, respectively.
Coefficients on control variables are not reported for brevity.
CEO narcissism -0.351 1.717** -0.228 -0.350 -0.327 1.984**
(0.414) (0.040) (0.500) (0.434) (0.451) (0.015)
... x Tenure -0.722** -0.797***
(0.018) (0.009)
... x Pay prominence -0.439 -0.398
(0.250) (0.337)
... x Pay on table -0.013 0.245
(0.973) (0.623)
... x ROA -0.523 -0.685
(0.246) (0.129)
... x Ind. ROA -0.081 0.164
(0.833) (0.663)
Tenure -0.090 0.006 -0.066 -0.090 -0.085 0.027
(0.650) (0.974) (0.727) (0.654) (0.667) (0.887)
Pay prominence -0.204 -0.363 -0.167 -0.203 -0.251 -0.401
(0.642) (0.404) (0.708) (0.651) (0.570) (0.389)
Pay on table 0.444 0.674 0.561 0.451 0.486 0.751
(0.382) (0.206) (0.303) (0.453) (0.341) (0.285)
ROA -0.171 -0.572 -0.142 -0.167 0.131 -0.203
(0.772) (0.348) (0.808) (0.786) (0.842) (0.778)
Ind. ROA -0.539 -0.363 -0.489 -0.539 -0.570 -0.380
(0.154) (0.329) (0.195) (0.158) (0.169) (0.347)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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In contrast, the interpretation of the negative coefficient on the interaction term is
clearer. Even if CEO narcissism causes TMT departures primarily by inducing interper-
sonal conflicts of which the market is aware prior to the departure, the fact that the market
still reacts negatively to such departures when executives have longer tenure indeed in-
dicates that the loss of the executive is a net negative for the firm. Therefore, although
we cannot infer whether narcissism-induced departures of short-tenure TMT members are
a net positive or negative for a firm, we can infer that narcissism-induced departures of
long-tenure executives are unambiguously a net negative.
4.4.3 Odds of Mass Layoffs
Recall that our hypothesis 3 states that because narcissistic CEOs are less empathetic
than other CEOs, they are more likely to initiate layoffs, and those layoffs are less depen-
dent on poor performance. We thus model the probability of a layoff in any firm-quarter
observation as a function of CEO narcissism and firm performance:
Pr(Layoffi,t) = F (α + β1CEO Narcissismi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3Industry ROAi,t
+ γ′Controlsi,t) + i,t (4.3)
Pr(Layoffi,t) = F (α + β1CEO Narcissismi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3Industry ROAi,t
+ β4CEO Narcissismi,t × ROAi,t
+ β5CEO Narcissismi,t × Industry ROAi,t
+ γ′Controlsi,t) + i,t (4.4)
Where ROAi,t is the standardized return on assets for firm i in quarter t, as defined
above, and Industry ROAi,t is the median of the same variable across all firms within the
same 4-digit NAICS code in the quarter. We include both firm and industry ROA because
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poor performance at either the firm or industry level could plausibly trigger layoffs. The
vector Controls now includes all of the firm-level controls used in the TMT regressions, as
well as the average hourly real wage and unit labor costs for the industry, which, respec-
tively, serve as proxies for the value of human capital and total labor costs in the firm. We
estimate the above equations with a logistic regression. Note from table 4.5 that Layoff
takes a value of zero in more than 97% of the observations. Thus, we also estimate a com-
plementary log-log regression to ensure that our results are not driven by the finite sample
bias of logit models that might arise due to the sparseness of our dichotomous dependent
variable. We estimate robust standard errors clustered by industry, so our results are robust
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and any correlation between error terms
of firms within the same industry across all quarters.
Our parameter estimates and p-values from equations (4.3) and (4.4) are in the first
four columns of table 4.9. The coefficient on CEO Narcissism is statistically insignificant
in the specifications without interactions, but it is positive and significant at the 5% level
in the specifications with the interaction terms. We note that the coefficients and standard
errors are qualitatively very close in the logit and complementary log-log specifications,
so we conclude that the finite sample bias of logit regressions is not a material concern.
Henceforth, we focus on the logit parameter estimates because they are easier to interpret.
We also include specifications where narcissism is interacted with the average industry real
wage (our proxy for human capital value), as well as specifications where all interactions
are included simultaneously.
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Focusing on the parameter estimates and standard errors of the logit specifications
where narcissism is interacted with firm and industry ROA, the direct effect of narcis-
sism is significant in the expected direction in all of them. Hence, narcissism does indeed
increase the odds of a layoff. In addition, the exponentials of the interaction term coeffi-
cients are both greater than one, and using a Wald test we find they are jointly significantly
different from 1.0 at the 5% level or better. The latter finding implies that narcissists are
willing to initiate layoffs at higher levels of both industry and firm profitability, or stated
differently, that narcissists initiate layoffs following smaller declines in profitability than
do non-narcissists.
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of the effect of narcissism on layoff odds,
note that in the most complete logit specification (in the last column in table 4.9), the
exponential of the coefficient on narcissism is 1.074. This result implies that, for a firm
with average industry and firm-specific ROA, a change in CEO Narcissism from one stan-
dard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above increases the odds of a
layoff by a factor of 1.153 [1.153 = 1.07422], or 15.3%. Now consider the economic
significance of the interaction effect. The exponential of the direct effect of firm ROA and
industry ROA are 0.743 and 0.851, respectively, whereas the coefficient on the interaction
terms are 1.050 for firm ROA and 1.054 for industry ROA. Taken together, these point
estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in firm ROA and industry ROA at
a firm whose CEO has average narcissism reduces the odds of layoffs by a factor of 0.631
[0.742×0.851 = 0.631]. However, the same increase in both firm and industry profitability
decreases the odds of layoffs for a narcissistic CEO by a factor of only 0.702.
To determine whether narcissistic CEOs are quicker to initiate layoffs in response to
poor performance, we run the following specification using both logit and complementary
log-log regressions:
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Pr(Layoffi,t) = F (α + β1CEO Narcissismi,t
+ β2N(ROAi,t < 0) + β3N(Industry ROAi,t < 0)
+ β4CEO Narcissismi,t ×N(ROAi,t < 0) (4.5)
+ β5CEO Narcissismi,t ×N(Industry ROAi,t < 0)
+ γ′Controlsi,t) + i,t
Where N(ROA < 0)i,t and N(Industry ROA < 0)i,t are the numbers of consecutive
quarters with negative ROA that the firm or industry, respectively, have experienced up to
and including quarter t. If narcissistic CEOs are faster to initiate layoffs in response to
losses, we expect the exponential of the coefficient on the interaction term to be less than
one. As before, we cluster standard errors by industry. The results are in table 4.10, and
they show that indeed, the exponentials of the interaction term coefficient point estimates
are both less than one. Using a Wald test, we also find they are jointly significantly differ-
ent from 1.0 at the 5% level or better. We conclude that narcissistic CEOs do not require
as many quarters of poor performance before deciding to initiate layoffs.
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4.4.4 Stock Price Reaction to News of Mass Layoffs
Finally, we turn attention to our analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around layoff announcement dates. We use OLS to estimate two regressions, one with
and one without interaction terms:
CARi,t = α + β1CEO Narcissismi,t + γ′Controlsi,t + i,t (4.6)
CARi,t = α + β1CEO Narcissismi,t + β2CEO Narcissismi,t × Real Hourly Wagei,t
+ γ′Controlsi,t + i,t (4.7)
where Controls includes the same variables as in equations (4.3) and (4.4), including the
average real hourly wage for the industry. These regressions are presented in table 4.11.
In the specification without the interaction term, we see that layoffs initiated by narcissists
have announcement CARs statistically indistinguishable from that of layoffs announced by
a non-narcissist. In the interaction specification, however, we observe that the coefficient
on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5% level. This result implies that
how the market receives news of layoffs initiated by narcissistic vs. non-narcissistic CEOs
depends on the level of the real wage in the industry, our proxy for the average value of
the human capital in the firm. We illustrate the economic significance of the effect with
figure 4.1. Note that when the real hourly wage is two standard deviations above the mean,
a standard deviation increase in the CEO’s narcissism will tend to decrease the CAR by
around 0.75 percentage points. We interpret our evidence as supporting hypothesis 4 –
the higher propensity of narcissists to initiate layoffs has a negative effect on firm value
when the value of human capital is high, consistent with the view that narcissistic CEOs
can destroy firm value through layoffs by underestimating the value of the resulting loss
of human capital.
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Table 4.11: Layoff Announcement Returns
This table shows the estimation results to equation (4.7) in the paper. The dependent variable is the
cumulative abnormal return for the firm over a three day window. CEO Narcissism is a standardized
and de-skewed text-based measure of narcissism that is derived from the ratio of first-person singular
pronouns to first-person pronouns used in CEO speech (conference calls and interviews). Real hourly
wage is the average hourly wage for the firm’s industry. Standard errors are clustered on the industry,
p-values are reported below the coefficients. The labels *, **, and *** denote p-values less than .01,
.05, and .01, respectively. Coefficients on control variables are not reported for brevity.
CEO narcissism 0.113 0.010 0.194 0.102
(0.581) (0.962) (0.343) (0.628)
... x ROA 0.539 0.454
(0.179) (0.247)
... x Ind. ROA 0.026 -0.021
(0.803) (0.821)
... x Real hourly wage -0.486** -0.469**
(0.024) (0.021)
ROA 0.149 0.118 0.164 0.135
(0.766) (0.791) (0.742) (0.765)
Ind. ROA 0.414*** 0.416*** 0.400*** 0.408***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real hourly wage 0.201 0.199 0.254* 0.250*
(0.127) (0.136) (0.080) (0.086)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1064 1064 1064 1064
4.5 Conclusion
A large literature in finance demonstrates that psychological characteristics of CEOs
have important effects on firm value. There has been little large sample work on the psy-
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Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of CEO Narcissism on Layoff Announcement Return
This figure plots the predicted effect (using the results from table 6) of CEO Narcissism on the cumu-
lative abnormal return for a layoff announcement over the range of (standardized) real hourly wage.
90% confidence intervals are included around the predicted effect.
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chological trait of narcissism, however, which prior research has demonstrated to be par-
ticularly common among individuals in high power positions, such as CEOs. In addition,
there has been little work in finance examining how a CEO’s management of human capital
can impact firm value. Since narcissism tends to strongly impact how individuals interact
with and view others, the degree to which CEO narcissism affects firm value through the
human capital channel is a particularly salient research question to ask. Our results sug-
gest that CEO narcissism matters. Narcissistic CEOs can potentially benefit shareholders
in that their lack of empathy makes them more likely to terminate executives and workers
when appropriate. Their tendency to underestimate the worth of others, however, leads
them to underestimate the human capital cost of terminations and voluntary departures of
others. Our results imply that CEO narcissism tends to destroy firm value through the
turnover of other executives and through mass layoffs when the value of human capital is
high.
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5. SUMMARY
Economic theory suggests that these inter-firm links lead to behavior different from
simplified settings in which firms operate in isolation without, for example, product mar-
ket rivals and shared human capital. I empirically show that, in a multipartite economy,
linkages between and within firms produce substantial cross-sectional variation in firm
outcomes. In section 1, firm-specific breaches of loan covenants were shown to have im-
plications for optimal investment policy of firms with similar default risk. In particular,
lender-induced conservatism following covenant violation created an opportunity for pre-
dation by rival firms. In section 2, unanticipated data breaches led to shocks in a director’s
understanding of cybersecurity risk, and this resulted in changes in cybersecurity moni-
toring at the director’s other firms. In section 3, a CEO’s narcissistic personality affected
his valuation of human capital at the firm. Depending on the circumstance, this created
suboptimal levels of top management team turnover and employee layoffs.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR SECTION 1
This section defines the Compustat variables used in Section 1.
Outcomes:
• Investment1: capxy/ppentq
• Debt issuance2: [(dlttq+dlcq)-(L.dlttq+L.dlcq)]/atq
• Sales growth: (saleq-L.saleq)/saleq
Controls
• Leverage ratio: (dlttq+dlcq)/atq
• Net worth to assets: seqq/atq
• Current ratio: actq/lctq
• Interest expense scaled by avg. assets: xintq/[(atq+L.atq)/2]
• Operating income scaled by avg. assets: oibdpq/[(atq+L.atq)/2]
• Market to book: [(prccq*cshoq)+(atq-ltq+txditcq)+atq]/atq
• Return on assets: niq/atq
• Size: log(atq)
• PP&E to assets: ppentq/atq
• Herfindahl index: ∑i∈ industry jsaleq2i
1I take first differences of capxy in fiscal quarters 2− 4.
2I use L.x to denote the first lag of x.
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APPENDIX B
FIRST STAGE COVARIATE BALANCE FOR SECTION 1
This section shows how to calculate a single test statistic for covariate balance follow-
ing the propensity score calculation used in the group-by-group matching (section 2.2.3.1).
Maximizing the log-likelihood function of a parametrically specified propensity score –
Pr(τi = 1|xi) = piβ(xi) – gives the first-order condition
1
N
N∑
i=1
τipi
′
β(xi)
piβ(xi)
− (1− τi)pi
′
β(xi)
1− piβ(xi) (B.1)
for xi a K × 1 vector. When the dimension of β is also K × 1, as is the case when
using a logistic model, (B.1) shows the K moment conditions one could use to calculate
the propensity score via GMM. Following Imai and Ratkovic (2014), covariate balance
implies the moment conditions
E
[
τif(xi)
piβ(xi)
− (1− τi)f(xi)
1− piβ(xi)
]
= 0 (B.2)
for any vector-valued measurable function of xi.
The insight of Imai and Ratkovic (2014) is to take f(xi) = xi and apply Hansen’s test
for overidentifying restrictions (Hansen 1982) to the K moment conditions specified in
(B.2) with the just-identified model given by the moments in (B.1). Thus for a group of
firms c, matching between treated and untreated firms yields the hypothesis:
Hc0 : E
[
τixi
piβ(xi)
− (1− τi)xi
1− piβ(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣i ∈ c
]
= 0K×1. (B.3)
Because matching between treated and untreated firms occurs at a group level, there are
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many groups {c1, ..., cm} that each must satisfy covariate balance. If not, one or more of
the estimated groups used in the second step may have predicted outcomes that are driven
by observable differences between treated and untreated firms. To test whether this is the
case, I use Fisher’s method and aggregate the p-values from B.3 into a single hypothesis
(Fisher 1925):
H0 : ∩mj=1
(
H
cj
0 : E
[
τixi
piβ(xi)
− (1− τi)xi
1− piβ(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣i ∈ cj
]
= 0K×1
)
(B.4)
against the alternative that there is at least one group, cj , for which Hansen’s test for overi-
dentification rejects the null. The joint hypothesisH0 is rejected whenever−2Σmj=1log(pj) ≥
χ22m,α for α the level of significance and pj the p-value from the H
cj
0 .
Because the test statistic J used for (B.3) is itself distributed χ2 under the null, an alter-
native approach is to aggregate these individual statistics and reject the joint null whenever
Σmj=1Jj > χ
2
Σkj ,α
(B.5)
for kj the degrees of freedom of the jth test (Koziol and Perlman 1978). I report both the
overidentification test (B.4) and the sum test (B.5) when testing for covariate balance.
131
APPENDIX C
WORD LISTS FOR SECTION 2
Cybersecurity words. I search 10-K item 1A filings for the following words related to
cybersecurity risk: cyber, data?breach*, cyber?security, cyber?attack*, computer?hack*,
hack*, information?security, unauthorized?access, security?breach*. I use ? as a wildcard
to mean either “” or “ ” since some firms use the spelling “cybersecurity” while others use
“cyber security” or “cyber-security” (I convert hyphens to spaces in pre-processing). The
wildcard * denotes any number of trailing alphabetic characters so that plurals (e.g. “data
breaches”) are picked up in the analysis.
Boardex committee names. The following is a list of all committee names in the
Boardex database that I use to classify a director as having a technology role: cyber se-
curity, technology, technology environmental social responsibility, technology & develop-
ment, technology & products, technology advisory, technology risk, technology strategy
and innovation, technology strategy and investment, technology and acquisition, technol-
ogy and competition, technology and corporate responsibility, technology and environ-
ment, technology and quality, technology and reserves, technology and safety, technology
and science, technology and strategy, technology and transactions, e-commerce and tech-
nology, health it, health safety environment and technology, it, it oversight, it steering,
information systems, information systems steering committee, information technology,
information technology and security, risk and information security, safety environment
and technology, science and technology, science and technology advisory, scientific and
technology, technical, technical health safety and environmental, technical advisory, tech-
nical services, technical and commercial oversight, technical and operations, technical and
projects, technical and reserves, technical and resources, technical and safety.
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The following is a list of all committee names in the Boardex database that I use to
classify a director as having a risk role: corporate risk, enterprise risk management, gov-
ernance & risk, governance nominating & risk oversight, governance and risk, risk, risk
compliance and planning, risk & credit, risk assessment, risk capital and subsidiaries, risk
management, risk management & compliance, risk management and finance, risk over-
sight, risk oversight and management, risk policy, risk policy and capital, risk review, risk
review investment and loan, risk and capital, risk and credit policy, risk and public policy,
risk and regulatory, risk and return, risk and safety health and environment.
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